XIV 
the Sea Conference adequate time to produce a seabed treaty before 
commercial exploitation by U.S. nationals would be permitted. 
In the meantime, most U.S. firms interested in seabed mining have 
joined international consortia as a means of gaining investment secu- 
rity, risk sharing, and pooling financial resources. ‘They argue that in 
the absence of international law restricting deep seabed exploitation, 
they have the right to mine nodules in international waters. The De- 
partment of State supports this view. Obviously, the more countries 
or parties jointly engaged in such activities, the less likelihood there 
would be of claim-jumping or other conflicts. 
The United States is heavily dependent on the metals contained in 
manganese nodules, primarily nickel, copper, manganese, and cobalt. 
There is no domestic mine production of manganese and cobalt, and 
domestic nickel production supplies less than 10 percent of our needs. 
In addition, nickel and copper are not currently stockpiled by the 
government. While the United States is a major copper producer, in 
1974 nearly 20 percent of the copper consumed in the United States 
was imported. The reliability of foreign sources and the possibility of 
cartel action are subjects of grave concern. In this regard, the pos- 
sibility that a vast resource of these metals could become available to 
the United States through the operations of U.S. nationals while at the 
same time respecting the rights of all nations to the “common heritage 
of mankind” is a matter that bears serious legislative consideration. 
The majority of nations represented at the Third U.N. Law of the 
Sea Conference are from developing countries whose interests are 
markedly dissimilar to those of the United States and other tech- 
nologically advanced countries. This has been amply demonstrated in 
the negotiations of the former Seabed Committee (now Committee I 
of the Conference) by the position taken by the developing countries 
and by their formation of a common negotiating bloc called the Group 
of 77 (now 106 countries). This group, representing approximately 
two thirds of the voting delegates, generally favors a form of strong 
international control of seabed exploitation that is unacceptable to the 
United States. The Seabed Authority envisioned by the Group of 77 
would be effectively controlled by the developing countries (one coun- 
try, one vote), and would exercise arbitrary power over seabed devel- 
opment. This would be accomplished by permitting mining only by 
the Authority or, initially, through contract arrangements under which 
the Authority would maintain direct and complete control of all 
mining operations. 
The U.S. position at the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference 
favors a seabed mining authority that would license and permit quali- 
fied countries and private entities on a nondiscriminatory basis to mine 
areas of the seabed. The whole system for granting rights would be 
structured in the treaty to be economically efficient and to attract and 
guarantee security of investment. Faced with the prospects of little 
substantive progress toward attaining an acceptable treaty, the Admin- 
istration has recently begun drafting legislation to license domestic 
firms who engage in deep seabed mining. This legislation would also 
delay commercial exploitation to allow the U.N. Law of the Sea Con- 
ference additional time to reach an agreement. In further anticipation 
of deep ocean mining by U.S. citizens, an Ocean Mining Administra- 
