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pipelines, and the right to conduct scientific research subject to coastal 
State consent. Most developed countries would prefer a 12 mile terri- 
torial limit with the 200 mile area being an exclusive economic zone 
of the coastal state subject to international high seas freedoms. The 
coastal state would have the exclusive right only to explore for and to 
exploit living and non-living resources on and under the seabed and in 
the water column. A related unresolved issue is the question of the 
extent to which landlocked states and geographically disadvantaged 
states might be permitted to exploit the area within coastal state juris- 
diction, or even traverse that area in order to reach international 
water. 
Another area of disagreement is over the activities to be governed by 
the draft seabed treaty. One view suggests that al/ activities of what- 
ever nature and scope (even, by implication, those unrelated to seabed 
mining) should be regulated. Another proposal is that only explora- 
tion and exploitation of the resources of the Area and other related 
activities should be covered. A third approach limits regulated activ- 
ities to “industrial exploration and exploitation”, thus leaving scientific 
research unconnected with these commercial activities free from regu- 
lation. 
The exploitation system resolved into three maior issues: (1) Who 
may exploit the area, (2) the conditions of exploitation, and (3) the 
economic aspects of exploitation. Several draft proposals were con- 
sidered. Although differing in details, most draft proposals on the 
organizational structure of the international agency suggest: (1) an 
“Assembly” consisting of all parties to the treaty; (2) an executive 
“Council” with restricted membership but nevertheless representative 
of all major interests; (3) a Secretariat; and (4) an operational arm 
variously termed the “Enterprise,” “Operations Commission,” “Ex- 
ploitation Commission,” or “Permanent Board.” The basic difference 
in approach is in the location of the voting power or decisionmaking 
authority within the organizational structure. The developing coun- 
tries, because of their numerical superiority, support the concept of 
“one country one vote” and, thus, would place the decisionmaking 
power in the Assembly. The Council would carry out the day-to-day 
business of the organization within closely drawn policy lines deter- 
mined by the Assembly. 
The other basic position is to place the major executive power in 
the Council with authority for considerable flexibility in conducting 
the business of the organization. Various commissions could be estab- 
lished to advise the Council on technical and scientific matters. In this 
view, the Assembly would be primarily the political body to approve 
very broad policy issues. Most developed countries support this basic 
position. 
Another difference in the draft proposals concerns the composition 
of the Council. The issue revolves around whether the Council should 
reflect accurately the political alignments and strengths of the Assem- 
bly or be weighted in some fashion to consider those intersts who have 
the technology and financial resources required for seabed exploita- 
tion. A third approach, supported by the Soviet bloc, favors voting 
within the Council on the basis of equitable geographic representation 
(giving the developing countries two-thirds of the seats on the Coun- 
