93 
cil) while requiring a unanimous vote or “common agreement” for de- 
cisions on substantive issues. 
Three basic concepts have been suggested for the functions of the 
international agency. One proposal, basically the U.S. position, would 
empower the agency to issue licences directly to the exploiting entity, 
whether state, private, or state-sponsored private. Under this system 
the agency would establish general rules for safe and orderly exploita- 
tion and exercise minimal control over the operations of the licensee. 
The international organization itself would not engage in exploration 
and exploitation. 
Another proposal, representing the position of the Group of 77, 
would establish an Enterprise with a monopoly of seabed exploration 
and exploitation as an arm of the international organization. The 
Enterprise would completely control seabed exploitation, initially, 
through qualified state agencies or other entities and, eventually, en- 
tirely through its own funds, equipment, and personnel. 
The third basic concept, somewhere between the other two, proposes 
an agency with the power not only to issue licenses, but also, at some 
future time, to develop the capability to explore and exploit seabed 
resources on its own in competition with state or private entities. This 
system is reflected in proposals to establish a Management and Devel- 
opment Commission, an International Seabed Operations Organiza- 
tion, and an Exploration and Production Agency of the organization. 
The critical difference in these three concepts is in degree of control 
the international agency will exercise, through an appropriate organ, 
over seabed exploration and exploitation activities, and how much 
control will best obtain the maximum benefit for, and maximum pro- 
tection of, the interests of mankind as a whole. 
The United States took the position that the convention must 
guarantee access on a nondiscriminatory basis to deep seabed re- 
sources. Guaranteed access includes a requirement that mining rights 
be granted automatically to any qualified applicant. Furthermore, the 
United States advocated that the whole system for granting rights 
should be carefully structured in the treaty to insure that the system 
would be economically efficient and that exploitation would occur 
under a set of detailed conditions written into the treaty to guarantee 
the security of exploitation necessary to attract investments. Among 
the conditions stipulated was an application fee not to exceed $50,000 
for which the miner would receive the exclusive right to mine a tract 
not to exceed 30,000 square kilometers per area applied for. Other con- 
ditions required meeting a prescribed minimum time and expenditure 
schedule for progressing through evaluation to development. 
In considering the economic effects of nodule mining on the econ- 
omies of developing country metal producers, the United States op- 
posed price and production controls on seabed operations. Uncertain- 
ties surrounding the estimates of economic damage to developing 
countries producing manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt add to the 
politics of the issue. Some representatives of developing countries also 
stated that price and production controls which maintain artificially 
higher prices would not be desirable. 
_ The Group of 77 (now 106 developing countries) formed a bargain- 
ing team to support a mutually acceptable draft treaty representing 
