94 
their interests. Initially, their position, although not unanimous, 
would only allow nodule exploitation directly by an international au- 
thority. Early in the session at Caracas, after negotiating among them- 
selves, the Group of 77 introduced a new alternative text allowing the 
Authority to enter into contractual arrangements with private entities. 
Under this proposal the Authority would still retain direct and effec- 
tive control over all activities. While this proposal is still not accept- 
able to the United States, it does represent recognition that at least in 
the early years of its existence the Authority could not develop the 
financial and technical capability to mine the seabeds. 
In regard to the conditions of exploitation, the Group of 77 would 
grant the Authority far greater discretion in managing seabed opera- 
tions than the United States could accept. Their draft would allow the 
Authority to discriminate among various ocean miners and to impose 
arbitrary and unreasonable terms and conditions. Other draft pro- 
posals by Japan and the European Economic Community permit li- 
censing only to states rather than directly to private entities. 
Following his return from Caracas, Ambassador John R. Stevenson 
testified before a joint meeting of the Subcommittee on Minerals, Ma- 
terials and Fuels of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
and the National Ocean Policy Study of the Commerce Committee on 
September 17, 1974, stating: 
As in other areas of the law of the sea, the United States has sought in the 
deep seabed negotiation to protect its principal national interest in access to these 
mineral resources not by sweeping generalities written into treaty articles, but 
rather by setting out detailed provisions that explicitly prescribe how the system 
will work, what will be the rights and obligations of both the international ma- 
chinery established to govern exploitation and the prospective ocean miners who 
will do business under the system and what kinds of safeguards will be provided 
for ensuring that these respective rights and obligations are protected and ful- 
filled. Nevertheless, it is clear that inclusion in the convention of a detailed min- 
ing code alone would not fully protect our interest in guaranteed access, and thus 
the United States position also depends on achieving an appropriate balance in 
decision-making organs that realistically reflect existing interests, as well as pro- 
viding machinery for the compulsory settlement of disputes.* 
In conclusion, Ambassador Stevenson summed up the seabed mining 
deliberations in Caracas by saying, “Committee I is perhaps our most 
difficult negotiation, rooted as it is in widely differing political and 
economic interests.” 1° 
While negotiations at the first substantive session of the Law of the 
Sea Conference in Caracas did not produce a treaty for deep seabed 
exploitation, they did affirm general agreement on broad principles 
and reduce the number of alternatives to choose from. Among the 
major policy objectives expressed were: 
1. Encouraging the development of nodule resources. It was 
generally agreed that development of nodule resources is in the 
interest of mankind as it is questionable whether known land- 
based resources are sufficient to sustain long-term continued 
growth in material consumption. 
2. Minimizing the impact of nodule mining on mineral exports 
of developing countries. Development of seabed resources will 
ae U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on 
5 inerals, Materials, and Fuels. Status Report on law of the Sea Conference. Hearings Part 
2, Das Bok U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, 1974, p. 853-854. 
