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have an impact on the export earnings of a number of developing 
countries. Some forms of compensation, commodity agreements, or 
controlled nodule development were often advocated. 
3. Ensuring the participation of developing countries in the 
nodule industry. The large capital requirements and sophisticated 
technical ability required for nodule mining would limit the in- 
dustry to developed countries. Some form of participation is de- 
sired by developing countries, perhaps secured by restricting 
nodule mining to direct exploitation by an international authority. 
A more direct participation could be attained through joint ven- 
tures if a developing country had some capital to risk. 
4, Securing revenues for the international authority. Since most 
of the benefits from nodule mining would accrue to the industrial 
nations who would mine nodules, revenues for the imternational 
authority well in excess of operating expenses could be extracted 
from nodule miners. On the other hand, the view was expressed 
that high revenues may be used to the benefit of less developed 
countries in the short term but may add to higher prices for manu- 
factured goods, which would be detrimental to developing coun- 
tries in the longer term. 
5. Preservation of the marine environment. Prevention of pollu- 
tion and contamination in the marine environment is a concern 
of most nations. Research, equipment design, and establishing 
proper operating procedures prior to nodule mining activities 
would be expected to minimize pollution potential. This could 
be enforced through an international regime. 
6. Conservation of nodule resources. Although nodule deposits 
are continually forming and the current economically recoverable 
reserves are extensive, care must be taken to protect and conserve 
these resources. 
Many of the above policy objectives are to some extent conflicting. 
It is whether or not agreement can be reached on the delicate balance 
and trade-offs of these objectives in consideration of the widely dif- 
fering economic and political interests of many nations that will 
determine any future seabed treaty. 
The second substantive session of the Third United Nations Law of 
the Sea Conference was held in Geneva from March 17 to May 9, 1975. 
The session concentrated on the translation of general outlines of 
agreement into an informal single negotiating (not negotiated) text 
covering virtually all the issues before the Conference. This text was 
finally prepared by the chairmen of the three main committees as pro- 
posed by the Conference President to “take account of the formal and 
informal discussions held so far.” 
In reporting on the progress in Geneva to the Senate Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee joint meeting of the Subcommittee on Min- 
erals, Materials and Fuels, on June 4, 1975, Ambassador Emeritus, 
John R. Stevenson again found “it is now clear that the negotiation 
on the nature of the deep seabed regime and authority is the principal 
stumbling block to a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty.” He 
explained: 
The United States explored a number of approaches in an effort to be forth- 
coming with respect to developing. country demands for participating in the 
exploitation system. We indicated our willingness to abondon the inclusion of 
detailed regulatory provisions in the treaty and to concentrate on basic conditions 
