96 
of exploitation. We agreed to consider a system of joint ventures and profit 
sharing with the Authority. In addition, we proposed for consideration the reser- 
vation of areas (equal in extent land potential to those in which financial condi- 
tions were subject to the Basic Conditions) in which the Authority could nego- 
tiate for the most favorable financial terms it could obtain. The Soviet Union 
proposed a parallel system through the reservation of areas in which the Author- 
ity could exploit directly, while in other areas states could exploit under a 
separate system of regulation by the Authority. Both approaches were rejected 
by the Group of 77. Some developing country flexibility in the deep seabeds was 
demonstrated by their willingness to submit the entire exploitation system to the 
control of the Seabed Authority Council and to include representatives of desig- 
nated developed and developing country interest groups on that body in addi- 
tion to those selected on the basis of equitable geographic representation.” 
In the same hearings Mr. John Norton Moore, Chairman, National 
Security Council’s Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea and 
Deputy Special Representative of the President for the Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, stated that “it is now clear that the negotiations 
cannot be completed before mid 1976 at the earliest and at this time 
it is not clear whether or not a treaty can be completed during 1976.” 
The Conference agreed to schedule the next session in New York for 
elght weeks beginning March 29, 1976. 
POSSIBLE TREATY IMPLICATIONS 
In view of the wide divergence of positions on seabed exploitation 
and heretofore general unwillingness to compromise among the par- 
ticipants in the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference 
several possible outcomes are likely, such as: (1) A timely, successful 
(acceptable to the United States), and effective treaty will be con- 
cluded; (2) no treaty will be concluded; (8) an ineffective treaty or 
general statement of principles agreeable to all will be adopted; (4) 
an open-ended conference with a general treaty agreeable to all, or to 
a majority, will be signed with substantive issues to be negotiated 
later; or (5) a treaty unacceptable to the United States will be 
adopted. An outcome along the lines of the first possibility would 
require major shifts in position, primarily by the developing countries. 
Although hope springs eternal, there is little indication to date that 
such a shift might occur. If a successful treaty were signed, it would 
preempt any domestic legislation, if existing, and probably require 
enabling legislation for ratification. 
Since the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference was first proposed, 
pessimists have suggested that, in all probability, no treaty will be 
adopted. An ineffective treaty or broad statement with few specifics 
and generally agreeable to all, would be a face-saving conclusion for 
the participants, but would also be an unsuccessful result. Even 
Malta’s ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Arvid Pardo, the man 
reportedly most responsible for initiating the Law of the Sea Con- 
ference by declaring the sea’s resources beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction the “common heritage of mankind,” expressed disappoint- 
ment with the way things were turning out. “I suppose it would be 
better if there were no conference and no treaty at all.” 17 
An open-ended conference resulting in only a general treaty, leaving 
substantive issues to be decided later, would indefinitely postpone com- 
16 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Joint Meeting of the 
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Hearings. Prepared statement of John R. 
Stevenson, p. 11-12. Hearings. Washington, June 4, 1975, unpublished. 
17 Alexander, op. cit., p. 210. 
