97 
mercial seabed mining and, consequently, not be acceptable to mining 
interests who now have substantial investments in deep seabed mining 
technology. In such a case domestic legislation could provide a frame- 
work for regulating domestic mining interests during the interim 
period until a substantive international agreement can, if possible, be 
concluded. In the absence of domestic legislation, U.S. nationals could 
still proceed to commercial seabed mining at their own risks. 
If a convention on deep seabed exploitation that is unacceptable to 
the United States were adopted, it might not be acceptable also to other 
technologically advanced countries whose corporations or governments 
have already invested large sums in deep seabed mining. Countries 
with such investments include the United States, Japan, Great Britain, 
France, West Germany, Australia, Canada, and the Soviet Union. Con- 
sequently, an international monopoly for seabed mining would have to 
develop or purchase its own expertise and technology for mining (by 
some means of financing at a level equal to approximately half the 
total budget of the United Nations) or else provide an attractive 
investment incentive or contract arrangement with countries or private 
entities that already have this capability. 
Unless it became accepted law, an international convention is not 
binding except on the signatory countries. The strength of the conven- 
tion lies in the extent of its acceptance among the countries most 
affected by it. For example, the 1973 Inter-governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (IMCO) Convention on Marine Pollution 
from Ships required ratification by 15 countries whose combined 
merchant fleets constituted not less than 50 percent of the gross tonnage 
of the world’s merchant shipping before it enters into force. A conven- 
tion on seabed mining would not be effective for controlling seabed 
exploitation unless it were ratified by most of the aforementioned coun- 
tries with seabed mining interests. Judging from past experiences, if 
more than one or two of these countries did not sign the convention, it 
would carry less weight than desired despite the total number of signa- 
tories. The countries who do not become party to the convention would 
be free to mine the seabed subject to the public censure of the other 
nations. A case in point is Russia and Japan who did not sign the 
International Whaling Convention and continued to catch whales 
beyond their allotted quotas. 
If the United States were not a signatory to a convention regulating 
the exploitation of the seabed, the only controls on U.S. mining inter- 
ests would come from whatever legislation Congress might choose to 
enact. This legislation would not legally affect the right of U.S. na- 
tionals to mine the seabed but would regulate and control their opera- 
tions. Such legislation has been introduced in the last three Congresses 
by Senator Lee Metcalf and others. These bills were initially supported 
by the mining interests as a means of investment security. While the 
bills would still supply that guarantee, if enacted, the mining interests 
no longer feel the need for them as strongly as before. This change has 
come about largely through the formation of international consortia 
for deep seabed mining. 
U.S. companies are already on record stating they intend to mine 
the seabed despite the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference. 
John E. Flipse, President of Deepsea Ventures, Inc., speaking at a 
recent National Advisory Committee on Ocean and Atmosphere 
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