Lieber 



This statement of the principle of maximum uniformity differs essentially 

 from the statements of the established laws of classical mechanics. As ex- 

 plained above, the laws of classical mechanics are essentially a-temporal and 

 a-causal, and consequently devoid of historical commitment and evolutionary 

 process. The principle of maximum uniformity, though conceived here as a 

 universal proposition, nevertheless refers to essentially contingent aspects of 

 nature expressed in terms of hierarchies of uniformity which generally evolve 

 nonuniformly in space-time. It is precisely because the universal and estab- 

 lished laws of classical mechanics constantly refer to one, and only one, hier- 

 archy of uniformity, that they are free of contingency in all respects, and are 

 consequently amenable in principle to mathematical formulation; for all mathe- 

 matically stateable propositions are essentially free of contingencies which re- 

 fer to space -time and therefore in principle devoid of historical content. 



The principle of maximum uniformity is indeed a procedure rather than a 

 formally stateable proposition — it is the description of a process which is un- 

 derstood to operate universally. In this process the existence and operation in 

 the space -time manifold of contingently stringent geometrical constraints, as 

 well as absolutely stringent passive and active constraints, are among its essen- 

 tial features. The description and statement of the operation in nature of the 

 principle of maximum uniformity cannot be completely subjected to mathemati- 

 cal formulation, because: (a) time is conceived of as duration rather than the 

 times of events ordered as points on the real time line; (b) the ontological- 

 geometrical ground for stringent, passive, geometrical constraints is ascribed 

 here to the local impenetrability of matter; (c) force is the essential instrument 

 in nature for effecting compatibility and excluding contradiction, by reconciling 

 its universal and contingent aspects; and (d) the temporal and spatial contingen- 

 cies are expressed by the space -time evolution of various and distinct hierar- 

 chies of uniformity. 



This conclusion has a direct bearing on the questions concerning the nature 

 of biological theory and the kind of laws we can expect it to produce. It also 

 bears, of course, on the nature of physical theory and the fundamental implica- 

 tions inherent in the formal statements of its laws. It is precisely because 

 these laws can be given mathematical expression, that they are in principle de- 

 void of all contingency and consequently of historical content and thrust, inher- 

 ent stability criteria, causality, and evolutionary process. Conversely, it is 

 because the present laws of physics are essentially a-historical and a-causal, 

 that they can be given mathematical formulation. The second law of thermo- 

 dynamics is unique among the laws of physics. Whereas the other laws of 

 physics do not take into account aging, and therefore history, the second law of 

 thermodynamics does consider and compare earlier and later states of systems, 

 but not how they evolve from the earlier to the later states. 



We can sum up by saying that the physical laws as they are known are 

 space -time invariant and thus not contingent, and that the aspects of nature to 

 which they refer are devoid of the aging process. Laws of nature may however 

 be space -time invariant and still refer to fundamental aspects of nature which 

 are nevertheless contingent, and which therefore essentially include historical 

 and evolutionary aspects. The principle of maximum uniformity appears to be 

 such a law, and laws which we may expect to emerge in biological theory will be 



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