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The implications of this doctrine present numerous problems in international 

 law of the sea. What remains unclear is the outer boundary of this exclusive 

 area. What if the seabed has deep trenches in it? Does the coastal jurisdiction 

 revive farther at sea? Under part (a) of article I, cannot one state just keep 

 going, out into the sea up to the point where another state makes a similar 

 claim? And then, where are we left? Furthermore, what about the area beyond the 

 coastal state's jurisdiction, what regime rules here? Does res nullius or res com- 

 munis apply? It would seem that in reality, the only limit is that which is meas- 

 ured by the criterion of exploitability. 



There is a growing concern that somewhere in the near future a few ocean- 

 ographic powers will be able to occupy and thus appropriate all the deep ocean 

 mineral areas that could be developed for some time. 



Recently, President Johnson called attention to these dangers in his remarks 

 at the commissioning of the new research ship Oceanographer : 



"Under no circumstances, must we ever allow the prospect of rich harvest and 

 mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime 

 nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under 

 the high seas. We must ensure that the deep and the ocean bottoms are, and 

 remain, the legacy of all human beings." 



Clearly, we are now faced with some fundamental decisions about rights and 

 uses of the lands beneath the sea. Pressures for making the decisions are mount- 

 ing daily. 



In a paper prepared for the American Bar Association National Institute on 

 Maritime Resources. Mr. Francis T. Christy, Jr., outlined the criteria for the 

 establishment of a useful regime over the sea. In part, he stated : 



"In considering the alternative regimes, the basic objective is to arrive at that 

 regime that will be viable over the long-run and that will encourage the economi- 

 cally efficient, peaceful, and orderly exploitation of the minerals of the sea floor. 

 Its success will be measured against three criteria. First, it must permit economi- 

 cally efficient operations. Second it must be acceptable to a sufficient number of 

 nations both in the long and the short run. And third, it must be feasible." 



In the United States, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, in 

 its 17th report, dated May 1966, presented its arguments for the proposal that — 



"With respect to the bed of the high seas beyond the continental shelf and to 

 outer space, which are outside the jurisdiction of any state, we urge the General 

 Assembly to declare the title of the international community and to establish 

 appropriate administrative arrangements." 



With the United Nations owning and licensing for exploitation the sea 

 floor minerals, the income would naturally flow into the U.N. 



And, on February 15, 1967, Senator Frank Church proposed that — 



"By conferring title on the United Nations to mineral resources on the ocean 

 floor beyond the Continental Shelf, under an international agreement regulating 

 their development, we might not only remove a coming cause of international 

 friction, but also endow the United Nations with a source for substantial revenue 

 in the future." 



On the surface, we suppose, this may seem to be a most logical, necessary, 

 and simple proposition. But a more than cursory look at the implications of 

 such a move would reveal some of the numerous problems which arise. 



The U.N. would have to acquire jurisdiction over resources on and under 

 the sea floor in order to permit it to grant and protect exclusive rights of entre- 

 preneurship and to withhold areas from exploration and development perhaps 

 for the use of missile ranges and such. Would allocations be made to nations or 

 to individual developers? In addition it would have to have the power to tax 

 or extract rent or royalty payments for the use of the resources. It would also 

 have to be granted the ability to utilize or distribute these revenues in an ac- 

 ceptable manner and boundaries for its own jurisdiction would have to be 

 established. Probably some scheme would have to be enforced whereby the 

 interest of the adjacent coastal states would be recognized and perhaps they 

 would split royalties with the U.N. Some equitable method for doing so would 

 have to be found. Perhaps the closer the exploitation to the shore of the state, 

 the greater its share of the royalties. Some form of a bidding mechanism 

 would be necessary to insure efficient and fair allocation of the rights of 

 exploitability. 



Many other controls would have to be established. Definite time limits for 

 performance of the required exploration and exploitation would be necessary 

 as would some form of inspection to insure that the requirements of the lease 



