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invulnerability, has become a cornerstone of the Nation's strategic forces. This 

 submarine system relies on the ability to hide in the ocean for its invulnerability. 

 It is a flexible system and highly mobile. In many ways it would appear to 

 be an ideal deterrent to nuclear warfare for a long time. The mobility aspect 

 ;can only be limited by further limitation on use of the sea. 



Future design of sea based deterrents following POLARIS/POSEIDON may 

 take many forms. Underwater silos, for example, are a possibility. Should that 

 be so it may be that the maritime nuclear powers would like to keep the 

 continental shelves and deep ocean available for some use by such military 

 systems. This, however, would not necessarily be a bar to use of these areas 

 or the ocean bottom for exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 



The next major subdivision of Naval forces is the Anti-Submarine Warfare 

 Forces. The submarine threat to the United States has been and is expected 

 to remain a very serious consideration in defense planning. The Soviet Union 

 now has a large submarine force consisting both of nuclear and non-nuclear 

 ships. This force is being modernized and increased in size on an intense scale. 

 Red China has built a sizeable submarine force (third largest in terms of 

 operational ships in the world), and even smaller powers such as North Korea 

 and Egypt have conventionally-powered submarine forces. 



The submarine threat jeopardizes both our naval forces and our merchant 

 shipping. In addition, the missiles carried by foreign submarines can also strike 

 a significant portion of continental United States with nuclear weapons. To 

 counter this, the country now spends several billion dollars annually in develop- 

 ing and operating anti-submarine forces. When one looks at the anti-submarine 

 warfare problem from a military standpoint, serious dilemmas are posed. The 

 problem of protection against a ballistic missile threat is especially serious since 

 a large portion of the ocean is available for deployment. Continuous surveillance 

 is required to minimize the danger of surprise attack. 



Area surveillance is extremely difficult. Even if it were possible to erect barrier 

 lines which could count and identify every submersible which passes, these would 

 soon be lost in the vast ocean expanse on the other side of the barrier. One pos- 

 sible solution that might be posed is continuous tracking. If a transit through 

 a barrier line were to occur, friendly forces might conceivably follow the poten- 

 tial aggressor. This tactic, however, may prove to be both technically and opera- 

 tionally difficult. Indeed, it is doubtful if the tactic would be of value after dis- 

 cernment of our intentions by other submersibles. 



There is a temptation to look for a legal principle which permits the use of 

 a barrier. The idea comes to mind that a power could prevent penetration of 

 an announced barrier by military submersibles. This rule would be akin to the 

 blockade rule, which requires both announcement and the necessary power to 

 enforce it. This rule, however, would be a two-edged sword. It would be highly 

 destabilizing to other free uses of the sea. 



The alternatives then would appear to be to conduct intensified attempts to 

 track or to conduct effective area surveillance. If the latter effort is undertaken 

 another problem arises. This would be the perfection and deployment of the 

 sensing elements. The rules for military use of the sea should not forbid instal- 

 lations on the ocean bottom for the detection of submarines. 



Between tlie closing of a portion of the seas to military submarines and main- 

 taining the freedom of the seas for both deployment and surveillance, the latter 

 appears the more attractive course from the point of view of our defense. This 

 choice is heavily conditioned by the fact that United States has free access to 

 the seas and a large stake in maintaining free movement on and in them. 



The case of the submarine armed with nuclear missiles is a serious considera- 

 tion from the standpoint of protection of national interests. Certain policies 

 which might favor our military and our defense systems in this respect, are : 

 The rules should not deny freedom of the seas for deployment of strategic forces 

 by all nations. The rules should not deny freedom of the seas for deployment of 

 strategic detection and warning devices. Future developments of international 

 agreements should allow use of the ocean surface, the air and space above it, 

 and the ocean bottom for warning devices. 



Tactical Naval Forces are made up of many elements including Strike air- 

 craft and their carriers, amphibious craft, mine warfare forces, shore bombard- 

 ment ships, forces for fleet defense and logistic support ships. 



The use of the oceans as a base for mobile airfields for air attack against land 

 and sea targets, as well as for ASW search planes is an important military use 

 of freedom of surface movement on the seas. In a sense these carriers can be 



