476 
point out prerequisites for success likely to 
be overlooked as well as important alterna- 
tives which should be supported as insur- 
ance against failure of major efforts, 
provide a comparison with like efforts abroad, 
and 
criticize its own shortcomings and indicate the 
remedy for future revisions? 
Does it provide a sufficiently clear basis for ac- 
tion (or reaction) in its support by — 
the public, 
the scientific community, 
the Congress, and 
the Executive Branch? 
The answers to these questions ought to be 
“yes.” But candor compels that it be at best, “well, 
partly.” Duplication and waste do not seem to be 
evident on the interagency scale this plan is con- 
cerned with, but it has been impossible to confirm 
this at levels of greater detail. The work of an in- 
dividual agency often contributes to several goals, 
and most goals require the support of several agen- 
cies, but coordination at the interagency level is 
" felt to be generally effective in minimizing duplica- 
tion and waste. Thorough documentation is not 
possible. ; 
Mention has been made of ICO hopes for jaint 
marine centers where enterprises of an interdis- 
ciplinary and interagency nature might be under- 
taken. Since the need or utility of such centers has 
not been thoroughly documented as yet, nor is it 
being formally studied, it is not yet clear whether 
this may be an opportunity made possible by cen- 
tralized planning which is in danger of being over- 
looked. 
One possible inconsistency between goals and 
programs has been revealed. Unless the program 
for training new manpower for oceanography is 
more successful than seems likely at present, one 
or more of the federal goals will suffer through di- 
lution of the quality of the work force. The most 
vulnerable is the goal of strengthening basic sci- 
ence and the most likely encroachment is from 
43 
NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM—1965 
defense. Unfortunately the manpower problem is 
only partly solvable at the federal level, being 
strongly dependent on actions by universities and 
by individuals now outside the field. The present 
federal program should be carefully reviewed, 
however, to see whether more is possible. 
Ships and facilities, the longest lead-time items, 
seem roughly in balance with the goals they are to 
support, the rest of the programs of which they are 
a part, and with each other. The net gain of about 
50 ships which is planned over the decade together 
with the approximately $104 million in new facili- 
ties to be built averages overall to somewhat more 
than the ratio of $1.5 million in facilities for every 
new ship in the fleet which was recommended by 
the National Academy of Sciences Committee on 
Oceanography. Whether this will work out to be a 
proper balance in the way each is deployed is 
impossible to estimate at the moment. 
The comparison with oceanographic programs 
abroad was made to the extent the limited infor- 
mation allowed. It was limited to the present, 
rather than projecting into the future, and was less 
than adequate in the case of the USSR. With the 
possible exception of the USSR, the United States 
effort appears to exceed considerably that of the 
other world leaders in oceanography—Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada. All are sufficiently 
small, however, in comparison with their objectives 
to make international cooperation highly beneficial 
to each. 
The major deficiencies in this plan appear to be 
those which can be remedied by more extensive 
and systematic analysis of alternatives, choices, and 
their consequences. The ICO is not at present in a 
position to remedy this defect without some 
strengthening, and how this might be done will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Finally, whether 
what has been presented here is of value to the sci- 
entific community, to Congress, and to the general 
public, only they can determine. The hope that this 
will prove to be the case, however, has strongly mo- 
tivated the effort which this document represents. 
