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that spills may well occur in which the mechanical removal of oil 

 is not possible due to environmental conditions or weather condi- 

 tions. Under circumstances such as these, it is desirable that all 

 options be available. The decisions to use dispersants would of 

 course be made using the criteria and procedures set forth in 

 annex X of the National Contingency Plan. 



In closing, Mr. Chairman, I must say quite candidly that I do not 

 believe there now exists an in-place capability to respond to a 

 major oil spill in the Outer Continental Shelf. However, the Coast 

 Guard will continue to work closely with other Federal and State 

 agencies as well as industry of course, to pursue development of 

 adequate contingency planning for the OCS, with the reliability 

 and the level of performance which we think desirable. I thank you 

 and the committee members for inviting the Coast Guard to par- 

 ticipate in these proceedings. I will be happy to address any ques- 

 tions you, or the other members may have. Thank you. 



Mr. Studds. One thing we have learned is that we should never 

 have anyone above the rank of captain testify on the part of the 

 Coast Guard, if we want to get at some of the facts in the matter. I 

 remember your diplomatic — how do I phrase this — your efforts at 

 the hearing in Corpus Christi to set the record as straight as you 

 possibly could, given the claims of some people of higher rank in 

 the Coast Guard about the capability of the equipment. 



Let me just say that I appreciate your testimony very much. I 

 find this one of the more shocking pieces of testimony from the 

 Coast Guard in recent years only because in my judgment it repre- 

 sents a complete reversal in tone, and to a large degree in sub- 

 stance, of what the Coast Guard is saying with respect to its 

 capability to deal with an oil spill in the high seas on the Outer 

 Continental Shelf. Members of this committee will recall that over 

 the years whenever I or other members of the subcommittee have 

 sort of pressed the Commandant, whoever he might be at the time, 

 of the Coast Guard with respect to that capability, we have gotten, 

 in response, a very definitive tone, with the Commandant suggest- 

 ing over the years, again whichever Commandant it may have been 

 at any given time, the Coast Guard was indeed far better prepared. 

 The state of the art was indeed far better than the deprecatory 

 tone of my question may have suggested. And whenever any of us 

 here suggested that perhaps we were not equipped to deal with a 

 major spill under routine, never mind adverse conditions in the 

 Outer Continental Shelf. The implication was that over the years 

 on this committee we were somehow being alarmist raising doubts. 

 Now I think you have unequivocably, explicitly stated what it is 

 that we feared. As you well know, your testimony tracts a letter by 

 the Commandant of the Coast Guard to the acting chairman of this 

 committtee dated July 16 of this year. Let me read you a couple of 

 things and I now all I can do is ask for your opinion but I want the 

 record to reflect very clearly what is happening here. The Presi- 

 dent sent a message to the Congress immediately after the Argo 

 Merchant disaster. The Argo Merchant precipitated, if nothing else, 

 a great many speeches by people in high office in the land. The 

 President sent a message on oil pollution dated March 17, 1977. 

 The Argo Merchant sinking was a December 1976 disaster as I 

 recall. In it the President said the following: 



