112 



Mr. Wyatt. You said earlier and I did not quite understand that 

 you were having some difficulty in working with Interior, maybe 

 difficulty would not be the correct word. 



Captain Corbett. That is not correct. Maybe you would rephrase 

 it. I did not say that at all. I said that in the earlier OCS activity 

 the Coast Guard did not become involved in review of the contin- 

 gency plans. Whose fault that is might be in part the Coast Guard's 

 fault for all I know. But as we started to see the activity on 

 Georges Bank and the intense environmental concern, then we did 

 become more involved with Interior and are assisting them in their 

 review of the contingency plans. That will be extended to other 

 areas as well. 



Mr. Wyatt. Is there some geological structure of Georges Bank 

 that is different from that in the Gulf of Mexico or Baltimore 

 Canyon that creates the environmental concern there? Is there a 

 higher susceptability to blowout; is there as I said a unique geologi- 

 cal structure in the Georges Bank? You know, we in Texas often- 

 times — I think, fish very near to oil wells. If we can find a well, we 

 go there and fish. So does everyone else. I think the same thing is 

 true in Louisiana. Is there a big difference between up there and in 

 the gulf? 



Captain Corbett. I have not the slightest idea Mr. Wyatt. But 

 there is a difference in the attitude I think of the people around 

 Texas and Louisiana. Oil has been king for a long time as you well 

 know. Coming from Oklahoma, I came from that part of the coun- 

 try myself. But it is not so up around the Northeastern part of the 

 country, perhaps. 



Mr. Wyatt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 



Mr. Studds. I am going to answer your question myself. Mr. 

 Hughes pointed out that traditional treatment for squeaky wheels, 

 lubrication with oil. With regard to the dramatic revision down- 

 ward of the goal in terms of cleanup capability 



Captain Corbett. Would you repeat that. 



Mr. Studds. With regard to the dramatic downward revison of 

 the Nation's goal in terms of cleanup capability, in the March 1977 

 letter the President stated the "goal is an ability to respond within 

 6 hours to a spill of 100,000 tons;" 3 years later the Commandant of 

 the Coast Guard says that our objective is a nationwide aggregate 

 oil recovery capacity of 200 tons of oil per hour, conditions permit- 

 ting. I cannot even calculate what percentage that is, but it is not 

 much, compared to what the President said 3 years ago. Instead of 

 100,000 tons within 6 hours it is now an aggregate nationwide 

 capacity of 200 tons per hour, conditions permitting. What hap- 

 pened? 



Captain Corbett. What happened is that we are having to com- 

 pete with resources of the government, and we looked at it very 

 carefully. We determined that we could respond with nearly the 

 same capability by reducing the numbers of locations by only a few 

 and reducing the number of men from nearly 330-some to 20-some, 

 and provide only slightly less, what in our view is only slightly less 

 response capability. If you like, I would respond to that question 

 more fully in writing. 



Mr. Studds. I would. Because I do not think the reduction from 

 100,000 to 200 is slight. Do you? 



