564 



Such cin organization conceptually could serve a variety of functions, 

 including facilitation (e.g., information sharing, observation and sur- 

 veillance, and other functions) ,- management (formulation of operational 



.63 



criteria and other policies) ; and even actual operational responsibilities. 



Aside from serving as an iir5)ortant element of a legal case for sxib- 

 seabed disposal under the provisions cited earlier, such an organizational compo- 

 nent could also provide an important vehicle to resolve outstanding poli- 

 tical issues. Political opposition to sub-seabed disposal could easily 

 arise since sub-seabed disposal could be perceived to pose some level of 

 risk for the global marine environment and would represent a use of the 

 deep seabed which has been claimed as the common heritage of mankind. 

 Although sub-seabed disposal could be claimed to be a universal benefit 

 in that it could solve a severe problem for many nations, viz . the HLW 

 disposal problem, the less-developed countries (LDC's) could plausibly 

 contend that the proposal would primarily, at least in the intermediate 

 term, benefit the advanced industrial States which are accumulating signi- 

 ficant amounts of HLW as a result of widespread commercial nuclear power 

 generation. The creation of a new international institutional framework 

 for sub-seabed disposal which involved appropriate forms of international 

 organization could moderate these objections. Through a new institutional 

 regime, sub-seabed disposal could be linked to other issues involving the 

 nuclear fuel cycle and the much-contested obligations of States under 

 the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) . Sub-seabed disposal, since 

 it would occur in areas beyond national jurisdiction, could be linked to 

 an overall internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. For example, 

 an institutional framework to implement sub-seabed disposal could be linked 



