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resources of the continental shelf under the aegis of the coastal state, to the 
extent that the coastal state desires and is capable of so developing. 
A limited purpose regime can similarly encourage and secure the development 
of mineral resources in ocean space. The linkage of this purpose with military 
considerations will result in less than the optimum which is obtainable in either 
the economic or military sphere. 
In other words, the Declaration of Principles should envisage an international 
mechanism for administration on as strictly a commercial and economic basis as 
is possible. It will work better that way. It will be simpler to administer, it will 
be easier to get adopted, and disputes arising out of it can be settled on ‘a much 
lower plane. Military and other not necessarily related considerations can and 
should be dealt with in separate instruments on separate bases. 
For the moment I will pass over Part VI, Limits of the Continental Shelf, and 
turn to Part VII, the Sea Guard. I have mixed feelings about the proposal for 
the Sea Guard. The existence of it would reduce the dangers of an armed clash 
of national forces arising out of conflicting claims in ocean space. The develop- 
ment of an international sea force is a step in the direction of creating an inter- 
national force to reduce the chances of national conflict, which is generally to be 
applauded. 
On the other hand, in consideration of the overall objectives of this Declara- 
tion of Principles, the rationale for the Sea Guard largely disappears if mili- 
tary use restrictions are deleted from the proposed Declaration of Principles. It 
may be useful to create the U.N. Sea Guard if political and military issues are 
to be dealt with in this Declaration. But if we deal with clearly economic and 
commercial matters, then the Sea Guard does not appear necessary. 
If the Sea Guard is compared in power to the naval forces of any national 
fleet, proportionally it probably is reduced simply to an observer force anyway. 
To police compliance with commercial restrictions relating to the licensing or 
claim registry, an observer force without the military connotations of the Sea 
Guard could be utilized for commercial inspection purposes, and would fulfill all 
required functions. 
Turning now to Part VIII, Crimes in Ocean Space, I think this is a highly 
useful and necessary provision. It is a good example of various provisions scat- 
tered throughout this Declaration of Principles on which I have not commented, 
which are laudable and probably non-controversial, and might be overlooked 
without Senator Pell’s having introduced Senate Resolution 33. 
I have deferred discussion of Part VI, Limits of the Continental Shelf, until the 
last, because the problems raised by this are illustrative of the interrelationship 
of the boundary location and the legal regime governing ocean space, are a dem- 
onstration of the degree and source of the urgency to create the detailed legal 
regime for ocean space, and discussion of this logically leads into the overall pro- 
cedure which I believe we should follow to secure the objectives of this Declara- 
tion of Principles. 
First of all, in regard to the limits of the continental shelf and the recom- 
mended boundary at a depth of 550 meters or a distance of 50 miles from the 
base line of the territorial sea, remember the history of all negotiations con- 
nected with boundaries in the deep sea. At every international conference it ap- 
pears that the other nations wait to see the position of the United ‘States on the 
boundary of the territorial sea, the continental shelf, or whatever is up for dis- 
cussion, and then take the U.S. position as the narrowest and proceed from there 
to enlarge it. 
An enormous part of nite discussion of the boundary of the continental shelf 
has come from advocates of a so-called broad shelf, who appear to be animated 
by a fear that other nations will not accept a claim by the United States to a 
broad shelf, and that there is some immediate requirement that the United States 
assert such a claim. All history of similar negotiations show just the opposite. 
We have no difficulty getting accepted however broad a claim we make, the 
others have always gone us several miles better. 
Now what is the urgency of creating this international legal regime, and how 
does this urgency derive from the interrelationship of the boundary location and 
the character of this new international legal regime governing ocean space? 
I must say that I agree with Senator Pell that there is some urgency in develop- 
ing a more detailed public order for the oceans, although I would not call it 
exactly a “threat of anarchy’, since there is no legal void existing in the deep 
ocean. The long recognized principles of freedom of the seas apply to the use of 
