578 
tinental land mass. In the view widely held among our members, all of the sub- 
merged continental land mass is subject to national jurisdiction over its natural 
resources. In the view of a significant number of our members any part of this 
land mass will come within national jurisdiction as soon as it becomes accessible 
to exploitation. dw ieark 
We reaffirm our opinion that it would not be desirable, in terms of overall 
United States interests, to seek a formal international conference for the pur- 
pose of fixing a precise boundary for the legal shelf. We believe it both preferable 
and proper to achieve this aim through parallel declarations by interested states 
announcing a uniform interpretation of the criteria embodied in the 1958 
Convention. 
We reaffirm our opinion that the United States should assert to the full rights 
over adjacent submarine areas now vested in it by the Shelf Convention and by 
general international law. 
We reaffirm our opinion that claims to rights in excess of those recognized in 
the Shelf Convention (such as rights over the superjacent waters, non-sedentary 
fisheries, or airspace) are invalid extensions of the continental shelf doctrine, 
and should be so regarded by the United States. 
The position stated in these comments necessarily leads us to disagree with rec- 
ommendations of the Commission on Marine Science Engineering and Re- 
sources “. .. that the United States should take the initiative to secure interna- 
tional agreement on a seaward limit for the legal shelf at the 200-meter line (or 
50 miles offshore, whichever is greater). Both these limits have now been ex- 
ceeded in practice, and they must be regarded as obsolete. We also disagree with 
the proposed initiative to seek international agreement if this means the convo- 
eation of a formal conference for that purpose.” 
Now, Mr. Chairman, I turn to the second subject of discussion ; 
namely, mineral resources seaward of the limits of national jurisdic- 
tion. Beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, what international ar- 
rangements should govern mineral] development ? 
On this point the House of Delegates’ recommendation in 1968 said 
this: 
That on the basis of the information now available, the most desirable long- 
range goal for a regime to govern exploration and development of the mineral 
resources of the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction is not the creation of a supersovereignty with power to grant or 
deny mineral concessions, but rather agreement upon norms of conduct designed 
to minimize conflicts between sovereigns which undertake such exploration and 
development. 
That the resources of the bed and subsoil of the deep sea, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction, be the subject of a study and consultation with a view to 
formulating rules and practices to be observed by common restraint or by other 
arrangements which will assure, inter alia, freedom of exploration by all nations 
on a nondiscriminatory basis, security of tenure to those engaged in producing 
the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and de- 
velop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples ... 
The Marine Science Commission report recommends an Interna- 
tional Registry Office, in which nations shall register their claims to 
the deep sea bed, on a first in time first in right basis. On this, our 
1969 joint report says: 
Our 1968 Report (pp. 12-13) suggested consideration of a registry scheme 
as a long-range objective in contrast with proposals for vesting jurisdiction in 
a supranational agency to grant or deny mineral concessions in the areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. We consequently approve the Commission’s similar con- 
clusion, which avoids vesting of title to deep-sea resources in the United Nations 
(p. 147) and which seeks to create an administrative organ of limited but useful 
scope. In varying degrees, however, we have misgivings over specific details of 
the Commission’s proposal, including the following : 
(1) The structure of the Authority. Its organization must reflect the 
realities of ocean capabilities, and must be insulated from caprices of the 
moment in the General Assembly. 
