650 
There are considerable intramural differences within this second group, but 
the weight of opinion within it views the language of Article 1 as setting a mini- 
mum limit of 200 meters and an ultimate limit in terms of adjacency. Between 
these extremes the actual jurisdiction of the coastal state at any given time is 
governed by the limit of exploitability at that time—i.e., by the state of the art. 
This view, its proponents claim, is essentially what was intended by the authors 
of the Convention. The ultimate limit defined by adjacency, they say, may well 
be equivalent to the foot of the continental slope, but until exploitability reaches 
that point the jurisdiction of the coastal state remains in futuro. 
With regard to the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, this group finds the 
holding of the International Court to be of limited significance in the present 
context. The Court was there dealing with the allocation of areas entirely within 
the 200-meter line and with the inequitable results produced by equidistant 
lateral boundaries under certain geographical circumstances. It had no reason 
to consider or pass upon problems relating to the continental terrace or slope. 
5. Policy considerations 
Distinct from the question of the proper construction of the Convention text 
is the question of what is a desirable limit for the legal shelf in terms of the 
broad national interests of the United States. The Commission Report, as noted 
above, concludes that a shelf claim of the kind advocated in the NPC Report, 
would not promote these interests. Among the arguments which have been ad- 
duced to support this view, in the Report and elsewhere, are the following : 
(1) A broad shelf doctrine would benefit other nations proportionately more 
than the United States, subjecting large areas to national jurisdictions which 
could. then exclude or impede U.S. access to such areas. ; 
(2) Enterprises based in developed countries can compete advantageously in 
the areas adjacent to their shores, making a broad treaty shelf unnecessary for 
them. But a broad shelf in the rest of the world could effectively exclude activities 
by American enterprises or expose them to the same hazard of expropriation as 
exists on land. Looking at the world as a whole, enterprises interested in explor- 
ing and exploiting the resources of a sea bed stand to gain by a narrow shelf 
provided a satisfactory regime for the deep sea is established without undue 
delay. Such a limited regime would be preferable to national regimes in many 
parts of the world. 
(3) A wide shelf doctrine would encourage enlarged national claims to the 
superjacent waters and their resources and to the airspace above. This could be 
detrimental to U.S. fishing interests. The excessive claims of this kind made by 
some states after the Truman Proclamation of 1945, and the troubles ensuing 
therefrom, are cited as a warning of what can be expected. 
(4) A wide shelf doctrine would run counter to the U.S. policy to maintain the 
traditional maximum freedom of the high seas in the interest of the multiple 
uses, including military uses, which the United States makes of the oceans. 
(5) Persons concerned with scientific research favor a narrow shelf, believing 
that a broad shelf could result in national interference with research expeditions. 
(6) To the extent that a policy of import quotas is warranted to protect the 
domestic oil extraction industry, a narrow shelf is required to prevent nullifica- 
tion of that policy. 
Leading points made in reply to these contentions may be summarized as 
follows: 
(1) If the “broad” interpretation of the Shelf Convention is correct, the 
United States already possesses vested rights to the foot of the continental slope. - 
To surrender these rights to an international regime would be an abandonment of 
potentially vast resources and revenues which no imaginable quid pro quo could 
justify. 
(2) The “disproportionate benefit” argument is beside the point. The important 
fact is the great amount of resources, in and under the United States’ own con- 
tinental margin, which are brought under direct U.S. control on this “broad” 
theory. These nearby reserves could be of immense economic and strategic value 
to this country. : 
(3) The argument that a broad shelf claim will encourage excessive claims of 
other kinds by other states is also misdirected. The Convention expressly protects 
the high seas status of waters above the shelf. Those coastal states which have 
made or intend to make further claims to the superjacent waters or to exclusive 
fishery rights are not likely to retract their present claims or refrain from future 
ones merely because the U.S. opts for a narrow shelf. 
