651 
(4) Some states (the Soviet Union for one) are so strongly opposed to any 
supranational deep-sea regime and to the concept of common ownership that 
any early agreement appears unlikely. That being so, the area of national juris- 
diction should be as wide as the 1958 Convention can be construed to permit. 
Practical working arrangements on this basis should not be difficult to reach 
with the Soviet Union. 
(5) Assuming for the sake of argument that agreement is possible, it would 
have to be On a compromise basis and of necessity would involve some kind 
of international administration. Past experience suggests that this could lead to 
a system of rationing and possible discrimination against American companies. 
Furthermore, the time lag before any international regime can come into effect 
means continued uncertainty and consequent discouragement to exploitation. 
(6) If small U.S. producers on land need protection against an influx of new 
off-shore oil, there are better ways to accomplish this particular purpose than by 
giving up potential U.S. resources. 
(7) Scientific research is already being impeded off some coastal states even 
under a “narrow” shelf doctrine. If it is to be adequately protected and encour- 
aged, the necessary rights and obligations should be dealt with in separate 
international arrangements made specifically for that purpose. 
(8) The seaward edge of the continental margin is a natural dividing line 
and hence a much more logical choice for a jurisdictional limit than a purely 
arbitrary line somewhere on the slope. 
6. Methods of defining a more precise shelf limit 
The Commission recommends (p. 145) that the United States should “take 
the initiative to secure international agreement on a redefinition of the ‘con- 
tinental shelf.’’’ It is unclear from this language whether the Commission is 
proposing a formal international convention to this end, or whether the “inter- 
national agreement” envisaged is to be read as an “international consesus” 
reached through less formal means. 
A substantial sentiment exists among informed persons in this country that 
under present circumstances a new UN Conference on the 1958 Geneva pattern 
would not be advantageous for United States interests. Such a conference might 
well fail to reach agreement, for political reasons unconnected with the legal 
merits of the various proposals which would come before it. A result of this kind 
could weil convert present uncertainties into complete chaos. Alternatively, an 
agreement carried by a majority of small states might embody principles unac- 
ceptable to the United States, yet which would be difficult to disregard if for- 
mally adopted by such a conference. In either event, no real legal gain would 
result and quite possibly a retrogression would occur which could undo even 
some of the progress made in 1958. 
To avoid these hazards, another way to secure a common understanding as to 
the limit of the Convention shelf has been suggested in our 1968 Joint Report, 
in the NPC Report, the Interim Report of the Committee on Deep Sea Mineral 
Resources of the American Branch of the International Law Association, and 
elsewhere. This proposes that like-minded maritime states should issue unilateral 
but concerted declarations announcing their intent to observe a particular 
limit as the boundary of their shelves under the 1958 convention and to decline 
recognition of any claims by other states to a greater limit.11 From such a pro- 
ceeding a pattern of common practice under the Convention could emerge and 
might well come to receive general acceptance by the world community. In this 
connection advantage might be taken of the International Court’s recognition of 
the coastal state’s sovereign rights over the natural prolongation of its land terri- 
tory under the sea.!2 . 
7. Previous ABA action on a shelf limit 
A number of the considerations noted above as affecting the boundary of the 
treaty shelf have already been the subject of study, recommendation, and action 
1 The 1968 ABA Joint Report stated this point as follows : 
“If legal uncertainties are believed to constitute an impediment to utilization of undersea 
mineral resources, such uncertainties can be eliminated by uniform declarations of the 
coastal nations which are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, identifying 
their claims of jurisdiction with the submerged portion of the continental land mass, and 
reciprocally restricting their claims accordingly. No new conference to amend the Con- 
tinental Shelf Convention is necessary to accomplish this.” 
12 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1.C.J. Reports, 1969, at 31. 
26-563 O—70-—pt. 2 10 
