655 
(2) It is questionable whether the Authority should have unrestricted power 
to fix the rate of payment to the Fund. We believe that this should be settled in 
the basic agreement creating the regime, or at least that the agreement should 
set limits to the Authority’s discretion. Clearly the Fund should not have power 
to set the rate. 
(3) Determination of the membership of the Fund should be made by the 
parties to the proposed convention and should not in any event be delegated to 
the U.N. General Assembly. 
3. Powers and duties of registering States (p. 150) 
Each state registering a claim must enact domestic legislation to assure com- 
pliance with the terms and conditions of the international regime, payments and 
protection of exploration and exploitation activities. Failure to do this should be 
a ground of registry revocation by the Authority. The registering state would be 
free to apply its domestic law not inconsistent with the international regime, 
€.g., concerning working conditions, marketing of production and taxation. 
Comment: We agree in principle. 
4. Policing functions of the registry authority (p. 150) 
The Report does not recommend that the Authority have any general policing 
functions. However, since the Authority would have the power to cancel regis- 
tered claims for cause, it should have the power, according to the Report, to 
inspect and hold hearings. 
Comment: We agree, subject to provisions for review of possible arbitrary 
action by the Authority, as provided for in the next proposal. 
5. Dispute settlement (p. 150) 
The Report recommends that the International Registry Authority should 
initially settle disputes arising under the international regime. However, at the 
request of any party to a dispute, the Authority’s initial decision, including its 
revocation of claim registration, should be subject to review by an independent 
arbitral agency. 
Comment: We agree. We would note that the possibility of recourse to the 
International Court of Justice should not be ruled out. 
6. Intermediate Zone (p. 151) 
In the Commission’s view, mineral resources of the deep sea do not in fairness 
or law belong to the coastal states to the exclusion of other states from their 
benefits. 
However, the Commission recognizes that some coastal states may regard them- 
selves as having preferential rights to resources of a reasonable subsea area 
beyond the treaty shelf and also have a national security interest in adjacent 
offshore areas. For these reasons, some coastal states might be reluctant to 
agree to a narrow treaty shelf without recognition of their particular interests 
in the area immediately beyond. 
As a compromise of the foregoing opposing views, the Report recommends 
the creation of an intermediate zone of seabed, seaward of the treaty shelf as 
defined by the Commission, to the 2,500 meter isobath or 100 nautical miles from 
the baseline of the territorial sea, whichever gives the greater area. The boun- 
dary would be permanently fixed as in the case of the shelf. The Commission 
assumes that the 2,500 meter isobath is the average depth at the foot of the 
geological continental terrace or slope and 100 miles is the average width of 
the shelf and slope or terrace. (Geologists do not all agree that these assump- 
tions are true or relevant). 
Only the coastal state or its licensees would be authorized to explore and 
exploit resources therein. It need not do so, but if it does so, its claims must be 
registered with the Authority and would come under the other terms and condi- 
tions of the international regime. : 
Comment: This proposal is essentially an effort by the Commission to propi- 
tiate the proponents of a “broad” treaty shelf. Many of the arguments summar- 
ized earlier with regard to the proper limit of the shelf are also applicable, pro 
and con, to this intermediate zone concept. If the Commission’s “intermediate 
zone” proposal were adopted, in conjunction with a “narrow” shelf, foreign 
coastal nations would have exactly the same power to exclude American com- 
panies, or to demand burdensome concession terms, as they would have if their 
jurisdiction were commensurate with a “broad” shelf extending to the 2,500 
meter isobath or other outer limit of the proposed intermediate zone. Such a zone 
