656 
has, however, other drawbacks, of which the most weighty is perhaps its sheer 
awkwardness. Areas subject to divided responsibility are rarely viable, as the 
history of condominia and internationalized zones in international law indicates. 
On balance, we are opposed to this proposal. 
An alternative proposal which has been put forward would call for complete 
coastal state authority over the zone but would provide for some kind of pay- 
ments to the International Fund. Such an arrangement would be less objection- 
able, but it might lessen the incentives to the coastal state and its licensees to 
push on with development. It is also possible to foresee administrative difficulties 
under this system as well. 
7. Conclusion with respect to areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Under the 1968 Resolution of the House of Delegates, the American Bar Asso- 
ciation is committed to support the development as soon as practicable of inter- 
national arrangements to govern the exploitation of deep-sea resources beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. Such arrangements, the Resolution affirms, 
must assure, inter alia, 
“Kreedom of exploration by all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis; security 
of tenure to those engaged in producing the resources in compliance with such 
rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use 
to the benefit of all peoples... .” 
Execpt for the intermediate zone proposal, and subject to the various caveats 
expressed in the foregoing comments, we believe that the Commission’s recom- 
mendations for a deep-sea regime are broadly in harmony with the principles of 
the Resolution. 
We would reiterate our belief, however, that the details of the Commission’s 
proposed registry plan need careful attention before being submitted as a basis 
for international discussions. There are, in our opinion, too many loose ends and 
loopholes which might permit abuse in connection with the requirements for the 
registration, maintenance and vacating of claims. We are all against a “race to 
grab.” It is difficult at present for anyone to “grab” the deep seabed physically but 
the concept of registration of paper claims would for the first time create the 
mechanism to make such a “grab” possible. Obviously safeguards against such a 
possibility must be drawn with the utmost care, but the factual data necessary for 
meaningful draftmanship are not yet available. 
Many of our members strongly believe that the first step, in setting up a deep 
seas regime, should not be the establishment of a system which recognizes paper 
claims or purely speculative registrations, but should be, instead, agreement on 
norms of conduct to be observed by the nations capable of carrying out deep-sea 
mineral exploration. Such norms would be designed to minimize interference 
between expeditions or operators, and to preclude “jumping” of areas which are 
under actual exploration or development, plus reasonable protective margins. 
This, they believe, may well evolve into a more formal system of registry of 
claims, but only after enough information has been acquired to make possible an 
agreement on criteria with respect to areas, duration, diligence requirements, and 
other factors historically associated with mining rights. Such consensus on norms 
of conduct should be without prejudice to any agreement to dedicate some portion 
of the value of production from deep-sea mineral resources to agreed international 
purposes. 
KE. Relations between Government and private enterprise, and the international 
registration system (p. 153) 
The Commission points out that the relations of the United States, as a reg- 
istering nation under the international regime, with the business entities on 
whose behalf it will register claims are a matter of purely domestic concern. The 
recommendations which it makes for U.S. domestic procedures to deal with these 
relations are summarized below. 
1. Policies applicable to all registered claims 
The Report recommends that the Department of the Tnterior be the U.S. agency 
which would register U.S. claims with the International Authority. Companies 
would apply to the Department of the Interior, paying to it the fees specified by 
the international regime to be forwarded to the Authority. The companies’ 
royalty-type payments for exploitation should take the place of both the annual 
14 This concept was referred to in our 1968 Joint Report. 
