670 
The problem to be considered here, therefore, can be restated as fol- 
lows: What kind of undersea mineral regime will best encourage pros- 
pecting, guarantee security of tenure, and fairly balance governmental 
financial exactions with the risks of the enterprise, while bringing about 
the maximum ultimate recovery of minerals at the lowest ultimate cost 
to the consumer, and with an acceptable level of dislocation of other 
uses of the marine environment? 
The problem, as indicated earlier, divides itself into two phases: one 
related to the jurisdiction of the coastal state, the other to the regime 
(whatever it may be) seaward of the coastal state’s area of competence. 
IV. THE AREA OF COASTAL STATE 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 
The jurisdicion of coastal states with respect to the natural resources 
of the sea-bed and sub-soil areas under the high seas is determined by 
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. By that instrument 
the community of nations has decided that the interests of mankind are 
best served by reserving to coastal states exclusive sovereign rights in 
the natural resources of the sea-bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas 
adjacent to their coasts, not only to the 200 meter depth, but beyond 
that depth “to where the depth of the superjacent water admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources.” The basis for this recognition of 
exclusive mineral jurisdiction is twofold: the predominant interest of the 
coastal state in the bed of the sea adjacent to its shores, and the neces- 
sity for certainty as to what law is applicable to that sea-bed. To date, 
some three-score nations have given recognition to the principles of that 
Convention, 36 by ratifying it, the others by adopting major provisions 
of it in domestic legislation or regional agreements. From the wide 
acceptance of the principles set forth in the Convention, even by states 
which are not parties, it is clear that they constitute part of customary 
international law. 
However, for reasons seldom made explicit, some find difficulty with 
the boundary definition in the Convention, particularly in terms of the 
reach of the exploitability criterion in light of the principle of adjacency. 
Accordingly, a number of alternatives are now being advanced in vari- 
ous quarters for revising the Continental Shelf Convention in order to 
place a firm limitation on coastal control. The Committee believes that 
this assumption of a need to revise the Shelf Convention is unwarranted 
