1131 
firms tend to rely on their own activities to a greater extent then small and 
medium sized firms, and place less reliance on day to day activities of trade 
organizations except in major and rather general fields of activity. 
All of this is not to say that these large firms will not improve the status of the 
United States flag fishing industry. They very likely will do so by providing 
increase in total market, stability in supply—demand relationships, and the 
enforcement of efficiency on those suppliers who survive. It is very likely that the 
final elimination of the padrone relationship between processor and boatowner 
will be a positive long term boon to the latter. But it will be different, and tthe 
adjustments will be considerable, with some being painful. 
D. The resource base available to United States flag fishing vessels 
Of course, strictly speaking, any fishery resource in the high seas of the world 
ocean that is available to Russian, Japanese, or other, fishermen is also available 
to U.S. flag fishing vessels. 
Expert opinion on the extent of underdeveloped resources of the world ocean 
is variable both because of inadequacy of precise information, and because of 
different criteria as to the size and character of the animals to be harvested. 
Generally speaking there is fair agreement among experts that the sustainable 
yield of the world ocean of the kinds and sizes of animals now harvested, without 
any major technological change, would be in the range of 200-250 metric tons 
per year, or 4 to 5 times that now harvested. If reasonable management practices 
are used, reasonable progress in technology is continued, and economics permit 
the use of smaller animals (in the range of 1 to 5 inches length) for fish meal and 
fish protein concentrate as well as for more traditional fish and shellfish uses, 
estimates range from a sustainable annual harvest of 1,000 to 2,000 million metric 
tons. More extensive acquaculture could expand both of these sorts of estimates. 
Neither of these estimates are very precise yet, because of limited knowledge of the 
ocean and its resources. It is safe to say, however, that reasonably good manage- 
ment of the harvest of known resources of a traditional nature will permit an 
expansion of world fish and shellfish production by 4 to 5 times the present levels, 
which should provide for expansion needs for the next twenty years at least, and 
perhaps forty. 
While these are mostly legally open to U.S. flag fishing, practical circumstances. 
limit this in most high seas fisheries and will continue to do so unless there is 
marked change in United States policy and actions in this field, which is not 
realistically capable of expectation in the near future. Hssentially the reason for 
this is that if the United States Government does decide to broaden and strengthen 
the ability of its marine fishermen to produce in any small measure of the way 
it has provided incentives to its farmers and petroleum producers, there are such 
large underutilized resources available in U.S. coastal waters that increased 
production efforts would center there for a generation to come. Tuna and shrimp 
provide exceptions to this to some extent, which are treated elsewhere in this 
report, as do trawl-caught groundfisheries of the North-west Atlantic, but the 
above statements are generally true. 
Another reason is that the situation of Russian, Japanese, and United States 
fish business in the outside world is quite different. Both Russia and Japan have 
as major objectives of their world-fishing policies the conservation or earning of 
foreign exchange. Thus they wish to use their own labor and their own flag-vessels 
as far as possible so as to maximize the area of the business within their own cur- 
rency. This has not been a factor with the United States at least since 1945, and 
really not for more than 100 years. It has preferred, and particularly for the last 
twenty-five years, to have fishery earnings bolstering the economies of foreign 
currency areas. 
Additionally Japan and Russia have had trouble steadily in getting foreign 
bases out of which to operate close to the fishing ground. United States fish firms, 
in contrast, have not been under United States urging (or provided with incen- 
tives) to keep production for the United States within the U.S. currency area, to 
use United States labor in foreign ventures, or to export capital to invest in for- 
eign ventures. Consequently United States industry has been broadly welcome to 
come in and develop fisheries in foreign countries, using native flag vessels, native 
labor, and involving native capital with equity either in joint venture firms, totally 
U.S. owned firms, or totally native owned firm. This pattern seems likely to con- 
tinue for the near future, so that U.S. firms will be stimulating fisheries out of 
foreign ports rather than those using U.S. flag vessels for wide-flung operations: 
in the geographic term. 
26—563—70—pt. 2——40 
