1264 
At least two different aspects of these recommendations require appraisal; 
these may be termed procedural and substantive. By procedural I refer to the 
proposal that the U.S. take initiative and exercise leadership; this proposal refers 
to “when” something is done and the connotation is that the U.S. must act very 
quickly. By substantive I mean to refer to the concrete positions the Commission 
recommends for the U.S. on the shelf limit and the region beyond. 
The key point concerning the procedural aspect of the Commission recommenda- 
tions arises because it is presumably being suggested by use of the phrases “taking 
initiative” and “exercising leadership” for the “immediate future” that the U.S. 
should accelerate the international decision process. Apparently it is felt that. 
unless the U.S. initiates and leads, the situation will deteriorate to the disad- 
vantage of the U.S. or that somehow we are disadvantaged by the initiatives of 
other states. Assuming this view of the Commission’s procedural position is 
accurate, the question is whether it seems likely that the U.S. will suffer harm if 
international action is not taken immediately to redefine the shelf for the purposes 
of the Convention and to create a regime beyond. We are interested, first, in the 
evidence the Commission offers for its anticipation. Second, it is reasonable to 
ask whether thought was given to what costs might be incurred if the interna- 
tional decision process is accelerated and an international conference is convened 
soon. 
On the question of evidence the Commission offers relatively little. Regarding 
the shelf limit the Commission asserts that there is uncertainty about rights 
beyond 200 meters and that this is deterring investment because of a lack of assur- 
ance of exclusive access. But the Commission provides no indicia of this deter- 
rence (nor does the underlying International Panel Report) beyond asserting 
that ‘representatives of industry” agree on this deterrence theory. 
This lack of evidence should not be too surprising since the fact appears to be 
that private enterprise (or some enterprise) have now secured leases or con- 
cessions from 28 states for operation off their coasts beyond 200 meters. If this 
is an illustration of deterrence it is reasonable to wonder what would happen 
if there were real encouragement. In short so far as the interest in encourag- 
ing offshore exploitation is concerned those who are now voting with their dol- 
lars do not seem to be especially apprehensive about the situation. If there is un- 
certainty it does not deter investment. 
Beyond this rather brief and elementary discussion the Commission nowhere 
identifies trends that, unless halted immediately, threaten harm to U.S. interests. 
The Commission does offer criticism of a particular interpretation of the Shelf 
definition, that by the National Petroleum Council, but since it categorically 
rejects this interpretation as wholly unwarranted and without any support 
whatsoever it does not appear to regard the prospect of this interpretation as 
requiring urgent action by the U.S. in the form of taking initiatives to secure a 
redefinition of the shelf. More will be said on some of the Commission’s observa- 
tions regarding the NPC proposal when we examine the Commission’s substan- 
tive recommendations. 
Turning to the leadership the Commission recommends the U.S. take to secure 
a legal-political framework for mineral exploitation beyond the shelf, the Com- 
mission at no place seeks to establish the case for viewing this as an immediate 
problem. The Commission occasionally ‘asserts that “the present situation’ either 
“requires” or “demands” such a framework and also asserts that this ‘‘must be 
accomplished in the immediate future” and is needed in the “immediate future.” 
As near as a close reading permits, however, the “present situation” is nowhere 
defined by the Commission except perhaps in a preceding section dealing with 
the availability of mineral resources and this section by no means suggests that 
there is any immediate need to exploit high seas minerals. On the immediacy of 
the need for an international regime, the Commission is content to make unsup- 
ported assertion. 
In sum there is almost no discussion by the Commission of how the U.S. will be 
harmed or be denied benefits unless it now urges both 'the redefinition of the shelf 
and the ereation of legal arrangements for mining beyond the shelf. As noted, 
I can also find no discussion whatsoever of the possible costs of engaging in in- 
ternational negotiations at this time or in the near future. 
The Report of the Commission’s International Panel also does not examine the 
possible hazards of international negotiations in the near future but does attempt 
to make a positive case for immediate negotiations to amend the Shelf 
Convention. 
