1265 
The Panel lists the arguments in favor of what it calls a “Wait and See Policy” 
and concludes that while these are “persuasive” in many respects, it would be 
unwise to accept them. The reasons for this conclusion are: 
(1) Legal planning and _ scientific-technological-economic planning are mu- 
tually reinforcing, hence the former should proceed immediately on the interna- 
tional level. 
(2) Actions may occur which cannot be changed though they affect the in- 
terests of the U.S. adversely and also the international community. 
(8) The U.S. cannot, on present policies, agree to a moratorium on exploring 
and exploiting beyond 200 meters nor could it adopt this stance unilaterally. 
(4) A wait and see policy cannot be a do-nothing policy else U.S. objectives 
will not be realized. 
(5) U.S. objectives require (a) a decision by the U.S. not to claim permanent 
exclusive access to resources beyond a certain depth and not to accept similar 
claims by other states, (b) a determination of a plan to promote exploitation 
beyond a certain depth if the U.S. is to lease rights beyond that depth. 
(6) The above factors, in sum, mean that even a wait and see policy requires 
the U.S. to decide what legal framework it prefers. 
(7) Since the U.S. must decide on its preferences on a framework it “might 
just as well take the initiative to seek that framework and thereby help to shape 
the future in a constructive fashion.” 
The difficulty with these conclusions and reasoning is that while a wait and 
see policy may require decisions by the U.S. it does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that we must or should take the initiative to urge immediate negotia- 
tions. Whether one does take the initiative may depend on other factors not related 
to this problem. Further, the actions taken as an initiative may differ from a call 
for immediate negotiation. 
The situation now does not call for the exercise of initiatives by the U.S. and 
while some leadership is required it should be exerted quite differently than the 
Commission suggests. The prime international problem we face is not that of 
securing a desirable international framework for deep ocean exploitation but 
rather one of seeing to it that U.S. and world community interests on a variety 
of issues are satisfactorily met. A framework for a type of ocean use which on 
the best available estimate (that of the Marine Resources Panel) is a quarter 
century away cannot be regarded as a priority question. It is quite possible that 
there will be some sporadic deep sea mining ventures in the period before the 
year 2000 but it is subject to considerable doubt whether the political difficulties 
resulting therefrom are likely to be so serious as presently to require the con- 
struction of a legal system. 
In contrast to the Commission’s recommendation of urgent action to deal with 
the immediate future, the critical point, it seems to me, is that the U.S. ought 
to urge both (1) the necessity for allowing ample time to states to prepare for 
international negotiations on the issues that are likely to be dealt with when 
the shelf limit and regime problems are dealt with in an international conference 
and (2) the interim measures by which there is reasonable assurance that alter- 
native arrangements are not precluded by the progress of technology and of 
selfishness. If this is what is meant (or is not incompatible with) the exercise of 
leadership and initiatve then I am all for the latter. For the situation we con- 
front seems to me to be amply clear. The general outlines of this situation have 
already been suggested in previous discussion, but more precise indication may. 
be useful. 
The key matter to understand is that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union 
nor the two together is likely to be permitted to convoke a meeting which will 
dispose solely of certain limited issues selected because of their special concern 
and importance to one or both of such states. The International Law Commission 
ealled the Assembly’s attention to this general point over a decade ago in noting 
the interdependence of numerous issues in the law of the sea. If anything, a close 
relationship between seemingly unconnected problems of ocean policy is more 
pronounced today than a decade ago in Geneva. It may be recalled, for instance, 
that three of the four Geneva conventions on the law of the sea (those on the 
High Seas, Territorial Sea, and Continental Shelf) are all by their terms subject 
to calis for revision at about the same time (June and September 1969) and the 
fourth. on Conservation of Living Resources, is similarly subject in 1971, probably 
before a general conference on the law of the sea could be convened. 
What this means is that for the U.S. to take leadership and exercise initiative 
on the topics suggested by the Commission as immediately needed, in all proba- 
