considerations alone. The Federal Government must also work out 

 an approach to economic regulation of the industry with due regard 

 for historic rights and social consequences. NACOA believes that 

 unless there is a limit to fishing effort, the inherent surge to over- 

 capitalization in any successful fishery will soon make it marginal. 

 Restoration of fisheries already marginal can be brought about only 

 by such means. 



• Protection for the coastal and high seas fisherman needs higher 

 priority than heretofore given. This is less a question of force than 

 it is of enforcement. Differential enforcement of fisheries regulation 

 on our own fishermen is neither fair nor ultimately successful in con- 

 serving the fishery. This implies stronger effort to achieve international 

 enforcement of sound fishery management rules. 



• Subsidized capital loans and technical assistance to developing coun- 

 tries should henceforth be conditioned on their compliance with inter- 

 national agreements on enforcement of conservation and fisheries 

 rights. 



Enforcement is no easy matter. Its requirements run the gamut in deli- 

 cacy from the scalpel to the jackhammer. Enforcement should be concerned 

 with economic regulation and conservation measures rather than be domi- 

 nated by political considerations. In each category U.S. and foreign na- 

 tionals are involved. Amongst foreign nationals there are those signatory 

 to a pact, those signatory but not granting rights of reciprocal inspection, 

 and those not signatory. However, the simple fact emerges that while the 

 United States is in a good position to enforce sensible conservation rules 

 on its own nationals, it cannot easily and uniformly enforce them on 

 foreign fishemien. It naturally outrages those U.S. fishermen, who, while 

 agreeable to abiding by conservation regulations, also want to make a 

 living in a market where not all the competitors are forced to abide by 

 the same rules. 



There is thus a tug of war between those pressing for unilateral action 

 in a fishery where the competition is distorted by differential enforcement, 

 and those who cannot see the United States do other than abide by the 

 rule of international law even when it puts some at a disadvantage. It 

 may be that the physical surveillance and enforcement capabilities of the 

 United States (satellite observation matched to the radio reporting of 

 position in the case of tuna convention enforcement, for example) can be 

 offered to other signatories so that enforcement could be more equitably 

 distributed. This is clearly a complicated question and the circumstances 

 vary from fishery to fishery both in nature and in emotional and economic 

 impact. As a principle, NACOA espouses improving general enforcement 

 on all concerned rather than in falling back where we are ahead of the 

 field. But NACOA realizes that the men on the line may have neither the 



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