302 
thus far is on the ocean dumping fees, user fees of one kind or an- 
other, as well as the concept of prudent and feasible alternatives. 
Although the witnesses this morning used the term “prudent and 
realistic alternatives,” I think the thrust is pretty much the same. 
I do not think there was any objection voiced, either, to the pro- 
posed prohibition against the use of unstudied ocean dumpsites. | 
think that these points that have emerged from the testimony thus 
far are worth emphasizing. 
I would like to highlight three key issues affected by the draft 
amendments which could be termed “the major ocean dumping 
issues of the 1980's.” 
The first of these is sewage sludge, about which we have heard a 
great deal. The legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the 
ocean dumping law clearly indicates, I think, that Congress intend- 
ed that whether ocean-dumped sewage sludges unreasonably de- 
graded the marine environment should be determined strictly on 
the basis of anticipated harm to the marine environment. The 
London Dumping Convention, which is binding on the United 
States, likewise, prohibits the approval of ocean dumping for waste, 
including sewage sludge, which contains certain specified blacklist 
constituents such as mercury compounds, PCB’s, and oil and grease 
as other than “trace contaminants.” 
I might note with respect to mercury and PCB’s that it has been 
estimated that up to 30 percent of the PCB inputs to the New York 
Bight are contributed by ocean-dumped sewage sludge in relation 
to other sources, and the corresponding numbers for mercury are 
on the order of 50 percent. Although it may be true that overall 
only 7 to 10 percent of the inputs to the bight may be attributed to 
sludge, in the case of mercury and PCB’s, in particular, those 
inputs are considerably greater. 
However, a 1981 Federal district court decision, which the ad- 
ministration steadfastly, and I might say enthusiastically, refused 
to appeal, held that sludge could be determined to be “unreason- 
ably degrading” only if a balancing analysis demonstrated that the 
harms of ocean dumping outweighed the incremental costs and im- 
pacts of land-based alternatives. It is noteworthy that neither party 
in that litigation raised, and the court did not consider, the re- 
quirements of the London Dumping Convention. 
Moreover, in rejecting the arguments and analyses of several 
members of this committee who sought to persuade her that the 
court decision should be appealed, EPA Administrator Gorsuch 
cryptically noted that “concerns regarding the convention do not 
provide a basis for appeal’’ because Judge Sofaer’s opinion “did not 
address the London Dumping Convention.” That was precisely why 
an appeal was needed. 
The only explanation offered was that the court decision “does 
not tie the agency’s hands with regard to the convention and leaves 
EPA with ample authority to assure that our legal obligations in 
this area are fulfilled.” In other words, EPA wanted the flexibility 
to construe its obligations under the convention in its own fashion 
without the benefit or burden of judicial review. One can hope, 
based on this position, that EPA will not object to the proposal to 
amend the act to incorporate the convention’s prohibition against 
materials containing blacklist constituents as other than trace con- 
