tiguous to it. The three-mile cannon-shot range suggested by Jefferson 
had long been outdated as a natural limit and alternate extensions of 
control of many sorts and extent had been proliferating. Substantive com- 
mittees were formed. They considered, in addition to the extent of sea- 
ward zones, questions of the living resources of the high seas, the resources 
of the Outer Continental Shelf, the regime of the high seas, and the matter 
of free access to the sea by land-locked countries. Specific conventions 
were proposed by four out of five committees. These were entered into 
force for the United States within the eight years following the Convention 
of 1958. 
This meant the United States had agreed to them. It did not mean they 
were ratified by all the nations involved so as to be enforceable inter- 
nationally, nor even that international agreement would remove ambiguities 
and differences of interpretation, especially since negotiated agreements so 
often bypass what they cannot solve. In fact so much was left unsettled 
that another Geneva conference was called in 1960 to deal with the breadth 
of the territorial sea alone. It failed by one vote of the two-thirds majority 
needed and the issue is still with us. 
The desire expressed by many that the nations of the world avoid a 
claims-stake race for the rich resources of the oceans led finally to the 
creation of a U.N. “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and 
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.” This Com- 
mittee convened six times between 1970 and 1973 to prepare for the Con- 
ference on Law of the Sea being held in Caracas in the summer of 1974, 
and possibly in Vienna in 1975. Its subcommittees met in dozens and 
dozens of individual meetings. 
The numbers of issues, alternatives, interested parties, cross-connections 
and influences are so profoundly numerous and complex that it is not 
rational, on the face of it, to consider agreement on all issues possible. 
However, it is perfectly possible that the good will and foresight of nations 
will be marshalled by the frightening consequences of failure. 
In any event, the task is not easy. In some cases the committees produced 
drafts of alternative positions which made the number of choices manage- 
able, but the choice no easier because the positions were polarized. In other 
cases many drafts were produced. Positions were not hardened, but the 
numbers of choices were multitudinous. And they did not eliminate even 
what appeared to be minor differences. 
The Interagency Task Force on Law of the Sea, with help from broadly- 
based advisory groups, has arrived at positions for each of the major issues 
which are supported by most of the interested parties. There remain 
divergent U.S. interests in almost every one of these areas. This is not 
surprising and is tolerable because these differences were at least con- 
sidered in arriving at a United States position. What has been difficult, 
Ze 
