and remains so, is that negotiated agreements in one area can have impor- 
tant effects in other areas. These are not easy to accommodate even when 
they are predictable and the tendency to revert to hard advocacy for one’s 
primary interest is tempting. NACOA feels strongly that the spirit of 
accommodation must be maintained during the Conference—and just as 
strongly that it is both unfair and unwise to forestall action indefinitely. 
In the pages that follow, we will review some major issues, interactions, 
and implications of possible outcomes. 
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
Success of the Law of the Sea Conference will be measured by the degree 
to which regimes are established that will permit the creation of wise and 
productive conservation-management programs. Failure will be measured 
not only by lack of agreement, but by inordinate delays even if agreement 
is eventually reached. The question we ask here is whether the position of 
international responsibility which the United States occupies imposes an 
unacceptable burden of specific restraints on our vital self-interests. 
One general concept helps set the stage: It is hard to conceive that the 
United States could benefit by fracturing the growing international con- 
sensus and the development of international law. Nevertheless, to be sure 
this is so, we must examine coolly, case by case, how likely it is for the 
United States to be pinned down and penalized in important areas under 
international consideration. 
Agreements not too far from the current positions of the United States 
delegation appear possible with two exceptions, freedom of research and 
distant water fisheries. And here we find it conceivable that success in 
other aspects of Law of the Sea could ease the situation in these areas as 
well. 
The Area Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction 
Because there is no international agreement on the limits of various 
forms of national jurisdiction, the practice has grown of referring to the 
international areas of the oceans, however defined, as the “area beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.” This allows nations to negotiate on 
questions of common interest and international law without first waiting 
for precise agreement on boundaries. At this writing, it seems reasonably 
clear that there will at some point be established a regime for the govern- 
ance of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. There will 
be in all likelihood an arrangement to implement that regime, although 
its nature, i.e., the amount of power it will exercise, and the type of voting 
arrangements it will use, are not yet clear. A severely restrictive regime 
would benefit neither the United States, nor the best long-range interests 
of developing nations because it would constrain unnecessarily the economic 
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