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Thus, Khrushchev, in classic, non-Communist terminology, declared 
the U.S.S.R. to be a great power (velikaya derzhava, a term used 
in Tsarist Russia), with worldwide interests and without whose par- 
ticipation no problem on Earth could be solved . . . 
Yet this transformation has given rise to political dilemmas and 
strategic dangers which may limit the benefit the U.S.S.R. may derive 
from its new status as an oceanic power. 
But until a full-blown, worst case combination of United States, 
China, Germany, and Japan develops (if it ever does in fact) the 
Soviets are likely to continue their expansive foreign policy. In turn, 
their activities abroad will undoubtedly include even greater use, and 
the resultant need for continuing the buildup, of their oceanic capabili- 
ties since that policy has in the first instance provided the major 
impetus for the buildup and the employment of such capabilities” 
(Thomas, pp. 23, 36.) 
The oceans policy of Soviet Russia effectively became worldwide 
under the aegis of Nikita Khrushchev in the late 1950’s. The earlier 
Soviet and Tsarist policy had largely been confined to the Eurasian 
land mass. The change in policy may have been more related to 
an increase in Moscow’s capacity to extend its reach than its desire 
to do so. There are a number of elements of historical continuity 
of Tsarist and Soviet ocean policy, especially as relates to naval power. 
The desire to extend power beyond the borders as far as possible 
may be one such continuous policy. 
At the same time when faced by choices between security of the 
motherland and foreign extensions of power, the choice has continu- 
ously been to favor domestic interests. Thus, the defensive capability 
of naval power has always occupied, and continues to occupy, a 
leavening force on the offensive naval outreach. 
Merchant marine, fishing, oceanographic and other ocean’s interests 
likewise have their historical continuity. With sharply rising economic 
needs and capability, the elements of continuity in the civilian arena 
are less pronounced than in the naval realm. (Shadrin, p. 47.) 
2. How does Soviet use of the oceans affect the broad range of 
U.S. interests? 
‘“‘When it comes to general ocean regime issues, however, neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union, separately or together, or 
for that matter in concert with the other major maritime powers 
(the United Kingdom, France, and Japan), swing a determining weight. 
As had become evident in the law of the sea negotiations, the 
acquiescence of the majority of some 130 coastal countries has 
become crucial to the exercise of the U.S. ocean mobility. The real 
and immediate threats to our basic geopolitical interests in access 
to foreign sources of energy and other raw materials, to commercial 
partners, and to military staging areas come from this quarter rather 
than from the Soviet Union. Indeed, on many of the general ocean 
regime issues, the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves 
partners in a minority coalition against the coalition of Third World 
coastal states. But, paradoxically, while a split between the United 
States and the Soviet Union on issues affecting general maritime mo- 
bility could play into the hands of the coalition of coastal states, 
evidence of close concerting by the superpowers on Law of the Sea 
issues tends to strengthen the influence of militant coastal-state na- 
tionalists.” (Brown, p. 45.) 
