3 
3. What is the rationale for the expansion of the Soviet Navy 
and its forward deployment? Does the long series of articles of Soviet 
naval chief of staff Gorshkov represent an authoritative position or 
an argument in a major debate where his view may be a minority? 
Has a new Soviet strategy of withholding ballistic missile submarines 
been developed as a move toward the wider use of the Soviet Navy 
in international affairs? 
“Most specialists in the field now accept that the initial shift to 
forward deployment was a response to the threat to Russia from 
seaborne nuclear delivery systems. Despite this general acceptance, 
some still find it hard to concede that this strategic imperative was 
a primary determinant of Soviet naval policy in the Mediterranean. 
A larger number have yet to accept that the same strategic plan 
shaped the second phase of the deployment. They argue instead that 
the motivation was political and primarily intended to extend Soviet 
influence. There is a decreasing minority who date this shift in policy 
to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and a few go back to Lebanon 
in 1958 . . .” (MccGwire, p. 165.) 
“Over the course of 1972-73 the monthly journal of the Soviet 
Navy, “The Naval Digest,’ published a series of 11 articles by its 
commander-in-chief, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorsh- 
kov. For Gorshkov this was an unprecendented effort, and it is un- 
derstandable that the series should have aroused attention in the West. 
Unfortunately, Western analysis have not been able to come to a 
meeting of the minds either on the content of the articles or on 
the question of whether Gorshkov was lobbying or speaking authorita- 
tively—and this too is understandable, since he does not make it 
easy for us to interpret him. 
I myself take the position that Gorshkov is probably speaking 
authoritatively and that his work represents, not a doctrinal statement 
as such, but what the Soviets refer to as a ‘concrete expression of 
doctrine,’ i.e., a work rationalizing particular tenets of military 
doctrine that apply to the navy. In my opinion, the content of the 
Gorshkov series reflects a Soviet political decision to withhold a sub- 
stantial portion of their submarine-launch ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
from the initial strikes in order to carry out ‘deterrence’ in war, 
conduct intrawar bargaining and influence the peace talks at the end 
of the war.” (McConnell, p. 183.) 
McConnell sees the withholding of ballistic-missile submarines as 
part of a wider political decision to use the Soviet Navy as a direct 
instrument of policy in both peace and war. He concludes that the 
Gorshkov series is an authoritative statement, which is intended to 
provide a doctrinal rationalization for this new policy. 
On the basis of the same evidence as McConnell, MccGwire con- 
cludes that McConnell is mistaken, by pointing to the body of 
evidence which argues that Gorshkov is involved in a major debate. 
4. Is the actual functioning of Soviet ocean policy decisionmaking 
and the operation of ocean affairs institutions materially different from 
the formal unified, centralized, and coordinated party-government or- 
ganization? To what extent are the civilian and military fleets in- 
tegrated in organization and operation in the U.S.S.R.? 
“The theory and formal organization of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government provide for and even 
