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require a unified policy on ocean affairs and on any major issue. 
An hierarchical policymaking structure is set up to consider the multi- 
ee components of ocean policy, such as naval, merchant shipping, 
ishing, offshore mining, scientific research, and water po lution 
aspects. Ideologically, the principles of party primacy and democratic 
centralism are maintained. The party is the authoritative source of 
values. The Government has the legal powers for enforcement, and 
the ministries manage their respective fields. This formal centralization 
and coordination of Soviet ocean policy differs sharply from that 
of the United States or any Western nation. The interplay of interests 
and promotion of individual or group goals is officially denied in 
the Soviet Union. 
However, the actual structure of Soviet ocean policymaking and 
the bureaucratic operations involved in ocean uses are far from 
unified, centralized, or coordinate. The decisionmaking behind ocean 
policy is fragmented with various institutions commanding marginal 
spheres of authority. The role of the party directive has been 
degraded. The need for technical knowledge and expertise is very 
evident in ocean affairs. Most ocean issues in the Soviet Union have 
not been crisis issues and are resolved through the standard operating 
procedures of the bureaucracy. Policies are frequently the result of 
bureaucratic infighting or of institutions’ independent and uncoor- 
dinated activities.”’ (Sulikowski, p. 211.) 
“The civilian fleets have clearly not been organizationally, struc- 
turally or integrated with the navy proper. They each have functionally 
autonomous administrative structures, whose ongoing concerns focus 
on the attainment of civilian tasks, and on the successful meeting 
of economic plan quotas and requirements. Each has its own func- 
tional research facilities and its own specialized personnel training 
schools. 
It is known that a certain number of military advisers or consultants 
are attached to the higher planning organs of the civilian fleets, and 
that a certain number of both their ocean-going personnel and their 
school instructors are drawn from reservist ranks (as also in a number 
of Western countries). But exact figures are inaccessible. It is further- 
more presumed that a certain, small number of active naval personnel 
are assigned to the civilian fleets, to operate the more sensitive types 
of equipment, and to ensure that the maximum military relevance 
is wrought from dual-purpose equipment. Yet again, exact numbers, 
not to mention job descriptions, are not available. 
As concerns equipment, there are obvious inferences to be drawn 
from the traditional heavy Soviet stress on standardization and in- 
terchangability of parts. Hulls, engines, radars, sonars, etc. are 
procured through defense industry ministries, such as shipbuilding, 
medium machine building and general machine building, and radio 
and electronics. Specifications from civilian fleet organs are channeled 
through the military industrial commission, which is presumed to be 
responsible for the meshing of civilian and naval requirements. 
Thus some shipyards, quays, and other port facilities are highly 
specialized and functionally oriented to the satisfaction of the peculiar 
demands of particular fleet branches (such as refrigeration trawlers, 
contained transports and/or elements of the submarine forces). But 
when dictated by calculations of optimality, economics, or expediency, 
