16 
such as the exclusive economic zone. The Soviet Union is a leading 
law of the sea conservative, no matter how much it doth protest.” 
(Janis, pp. 287 and 293.) 
“Given the question mark that hangs over a number of natural 
resource problems within the boundaries of the Soviet empire, it is 
noteworthy that the eyes of Soviet economists and military men alike 
are turning increasingly toward the untapped wealth of the sea. 
The commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, 
his definitive recent series of articles on naval power in the pea 
of the navy, Morskoy Sbornik, devoted a major portion of his conclud- 
ing article to this very question.” 
As quoted in the paper by Uri Ra’anen: 
¥ Soviet diplomacy has played its far from brilliant cards very 
ably and has largely managed to convince the West that the develop- 
ment of foreign trade is of far more benefit to it than to the Soviet 
Union. What is more, it has even used this factor as an instrument 
of pressure on the Western countries. 
“A fitting coda is provided by something that Henry Kissinger wrote 
in 1957: ‘We retreat before Soviet might and yet we are afraid to 
make use of Soviet difficulties. This difference in willingness to take 
a risk has been the Soviet Union’s main advantage in the postwar 
period, almost outweighing all its shortcomings.’ ” (Ra’anen, pp. 285, 
304-305.) 
Specific foreign policy issues illustrate the interplay of the various 
facets of Soviet ocean policy. For example, the fisheries issue with 
Japan and the control of Spitzbergen with Norway: 
“The fisheries issue has played an important, although ‘at times 
detrimental, role in the development of “good-neighborly” Soviet- 
Japanese relations. While relations in general have been steadily im- 
proving between the two countries, fishery negotiations continue to 
encounter both progress and problems In the past, the Soviet Union 
has exerted various forms of pressure upon Japan to secure its interests, 
including reductions of quotas and fishing areas, seizure and detention of 
scores of Japanese fishermen, and refusal to negotiate over certain issues. 
However, productive bilateral discussions have lessened the degree of 
conflict in procedural matters and have resulted in the creation of some 
cooperative endeavors.” (Houghtaling, p. 308.) 
“Sovereignty over the Svalbard/Spitzbergen archipelago hit long 
been a subject of extreme concern and sensitivity to Soviet security 
organs. 
Yet, finally, one must return to the point that the fulcrum for 
all Soviet policy initiatives in the area lies in the Kola base complexes; 
and that the character of these initiatives are determined by the 
geopolitical realities and constraints of the Kola Peninsula. Geopoliti- 
cal facts dictated the development of Kola as the most vital core 
area of expanding Soviet Naval and civilian fleets. Geopolitical facts 
dictated these fleets’ dependence on unimpeded passage through the 
Norway-Bear Island gap. 
Moscow could no more tolerate hostile control over that gap than 
she could tolerate hostile control over the mountain ranges of western 
Czechoslovakia (east of which the plains stretch flat, if marshy, to 
Moscow). If she considered Svalbard sensitive enough to warrant 
thoughts of intervention in November of 1944, then there can be 
no doubt that its much increased strategic value today would be 
