17 
seen to justify and indeed demand intervention in the event of its 
future hostile utilization.” (Jacobsen, pp. 321, 329-330.) 
6. When did Soviet merchant marine expansion accelerate? How 
does the Soviet fleet compare with those of other maritime powers? 
What has been Soviet maritime policy and performance as it in- 
fluenced the liner trades of the United States? 
“The Soviet merchant fleet achieved its most spectacular growth 
from 1962 to 1966. This expansion, stimulated by increases in 
seaborne trade at annual rates averaging more than 30 percent for 
3 years in a row, raised the fleet’s world standing from 12th largest 
in 1962 to 7th largest in 1964. Accelerated deliveries to other coun- 
tries’ fleets dropped the Soviet fleet’s standing from 7th largest in 
1973 to 10th largest in 1974. The fleet’s capacity at the end of 
1974 was 14.2 million deadweight tons (dwt), 3 percent of the world 
total and less than one-fourth that of the world-leading Japanese fleet. 
Although 65 percent of Soviet merchant tonnage is less than 10 
years old, a number of long-standing qualitative deficiencies place 
the Soviet fleet behind Western fleets in maritime technology. Because 
of draft limitations in U.S.S.R. ports, the average size of Soviet 
merchant ships is less than half the world average. Moreover, the 
Soviets have just begun to acquire tankers and bulk carriers larger 
than 50,000 deadweight, small by Western standards. At a time when 
the movement of general cargo in scheduled liner service on major 
routes like the North Atlantic and the North Pacific is dominated 
by containerships, roll-on/roll-off vessels, and other craft that carry 
cargo in modular units to minimize time in port, the U.S.S.R. still 
relies heavily on conventional general purpose dry cargo ships on 
which general cargo is loaded piece by piece. Although the next 
5 Year Plan addresses these deficiencies, the Soviet fleet still has 
a large qualitative gap to close in catching up with Western maritime 
powers in the liner field.” (Carr, p. 331.) 
Some problems for the U.S. liner trade have been exacerbated 
by Soviet policy. 
“The U.S. liner trade is essentially an open trade without restrictions 
to entry or exit. Groups of carriers, organized as shipping conferences, 
establish agreed upon rate levels for member carriers and operate 
on most of the major trade routes. 
On U.S. routes, Soviet carriers are operating under a policy of 
offering frequent sailings at reduced rates to penetrate our trades. 
They tend to offer lower rates on attractive cargo to maximize hard 
currency earnings from shipping revenues. 
There are several indications that a steadily increasing share of 
U.S. liner cargo is moving on nonnational flag cross trading vessels 
operating in our trades. Legislation has been proposed to remedy 
this situation, and it is now before the Congress. Senate bill No. 
868 would have as its objective the prevention of ‘dumping’ of excess 
ship capacity in U.S. sea lanes by these third-flag carriers.”” (Adam 
and Witteveen, pp. 347-348.) 
“It had to be recognized on both sides that a maritime agreement 
would be mutually beneficial. The Soviets realized that a maritime 
agreement would provide them continuing access to U.S. feed grains 
critical to their plans to increase the protein content of the Russian 
diet. They realized that future access to a broader range of American 
