19 
gas production, however, has made strong gains which have compen- 
sated for falling crude oil output. The Soviets feel that 1975 will 
be the turnabout year for crude oil and condensate production from 
the Caspian Sea and that in the next decade there will be a record 
expansion of the offshore petroleum industry. There is already con- 
siderable evidence to substantiate this projection. New development 
technology is beginning to reach the Caspian Sea in increasing quanti- 
ties, and more investment, material, and manpower have been 
authorized than ever before for subsea petroleum operations on all 
of the prospective Soviet shelves. There are indications that the Soviet 
Government has become increasingly impatient with the slow pace 
of domestic design and construction of modern mobile offshore rigs 
and that it may purchase more foreign units, using its limited supply 
of hard currency. 
The Soviets, with future energy requirements as great as any major 
industrial nation, are planning for an increasing effort in offshore 
hydrocarbon development, as a part of a total effort to increase oil 
production and to economize on fuel use, which will receive special 
attention in the next 5 Year Plan. This shift in policy is the result 
of the failure of domestic oil production to increase as rapidly as 
planned; current oil reserves, particularly in the Arctic, proving 
technologically more difficult and expensive to exploit than expected; 
and domestic and allied demand expanding faster than anticipated. 
By 1980, Soviet domestic requirements could match output, at which 
time the Soviet Union would have to become an importer of crude 
oil should it wish to continue to supply its allies. 
The Soviet Union appears determined to increase crude production 
to maintain its energy independence. It is raising its oil production 
goals beyond those which some Western experts have already judged 
to be over ambitious. As a part of this program, offshore oil exploita- 
tion will be greatly expanded, but the realization of the very high 
quotas set would seem to depend in part upon the purchase and 
utilization of additional foreign technology.” (Riva, p. 479.) 
“The Soviet Union is continuing to place increasing emphasis on 
the extraction of minerals from seawater and the development of 
marine mining. Reports in the Soviet press indicate that while the 
West is more technologically advanced in these areas, development 
is proceeding at a fast pace in the Soviet Union. In addition, the 
Soviets hope to increase the efficiency of their mineral resource ex- 
ploitation in many areas through acquisition of Western technology, 
along with technology development of their own. . . . 
The Soviet Union is fully self-sufficient in 29 of 36 key industrial 
materials, and the extraction of many minerals in the Soviet Union 
is doubling approximately every 8 to 10 years. Soviet exports of 
mineral commodities include aluminum, antimony, cadmium, chromi- 
um, copper, iron, lead, magnesium, manganese, titanium, vanadium, 
zinc, abrasives, asbestos, cement, clays, fertilizer materials, cryolite, 
graphite, gypsum, salt, sodium and potassium compounds, sulfur and 
pyrites, tac, carbon black, coal, coke, natural gas, and petroleum. How- 
ever, self-sufficiency is not the entire goal of Soviet mineral develop- 
ment policy. Exports of minerals produce foreign exchange to help 
pay for imports, even though most minerals exported could be con- 
sumed within the country. Fuels, minerals, and metals made up about 
69-315 O - 76 --3 
