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the exception of ideological rhetoric about support of international 
proletariat and of the secret financing of Communist parties abroad, 
Stalin never claimed for the U.S.S.R. great power interests on a global 
scale, much less acted on them. And his use of Soviet capabilities, 
particularly military, were confined closely to the Soviet periphery. 
Indeed even here his behavior was very cautious: he drew back when 
confronted by determined opposition. For example, in 1946, Stalin 
withdrew Soviet Army units from Iran after President Truman 
threatened strong U.S. action to force such a withdrawal. (The Soviet 
forces, together with allied troops, had entered Iran during World 
War II to insure the flow of allied aid to the Soviets; but in contrast 
with the allied withdrawal, they remained in Iran after the end of 
the war despite an earlier agreement for removal of all forces 6 
months after the end of the war.) 
But the foreign policy, inaugurated by Stalin’s successors, was not 
only a radical break with his policy but also impacted significantly 
on Soviet strategy. 
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY ON SOVIET STRATEGY 
The post-Stalin expansive foreign policy resurrected traditional 
strategic threats to and created new complexities for the Soviet Union. 
It revived the traditional two-front challenge to the U.S.S.R. on the 
Eurasian continent; created a new strategic challenge of the United 
States as a powerful adversary; and, triggered U.S.S.R.’s effort to 
project its support and influence to the developing countries far 
beyond its immediate periphery. 
GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION 
In the main, these strategic problems have arisen from and have 
been heightened by U.S.S.R.’s geopolitical situation. The Soviet Union 
is in a geopolitical bind unlike any other nation in the world. Striving 
to be a global power like the United States, the Soviet Union has 
not, because of its location on the Eurasian continent, had the ad- 
vantages of the United States. In a balance of power context, it 
does not have the United States option of playing an offshore role 
in a major conflict on the Eurasian continent, if that is considered 
to be the main area of U.S. and Soviet interests. Again, unlike the 
United States, the Soviet Union does not have the option of detaching 
itself from either Europe and Asia or both. While unlikely to do 
so, the United States nevertheless has the choice of “walking away” 
from either Europe or Asia, or both. 
The Soviet Union’s two-continent location also imposes on it 
strategic disadvantages which do not confront other major European 
nations. Thus, while Western Europe faces a direct threat only from 
the East, the Soviet Union potententially must consider a challenge 
from both the East and the West. Consequently, Soviet capabilities 
cannot be measured by simply matching them against those of either 
or both the United States and West Europe since this does not reflect 
the full magnitude of Soviet Union’s disadvantages. Even apart from 
the United States, the manpower, economic and military capabilities 
of West Europe objectively are, or potentially can be, equal to those 
of the Soviet Union; this may particularly be the case if considered 
