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THE CHALLENGE BY THE UNITED STATES 
On top of the traditional two-front threat, the United States has 
added an entirely new dimension to postwar Soviet strategic problems. 
In Soviet view, the United States challenge differs from any Eurasian 
threat for the following reasons: the United States is a noncontinental 
power, and hence beyond the reach of Soviet ground forces; the 
United States currently still has an overall edge in nuclear-missile 
capabilities, if the reported U.S. lead in multiple warheads is valid; 
and, most important, the United States has the economic and technical 
resources to increase its military capabilities which the Soviets could 
not hope to match in the foreseeable future; therefore unless the 
United States deliberately permits it, the U.S.S.R. cannot get a per- 
manent, overwhelming edge over the United States. Consequently, 
a possible U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation poses almost insoluble problems 
for the Soviets. Unlike a German attack on the Soviet Union, which 
at worst could be blunted by the traditional Russian strategy of trading 
space for time, a U.S. nuclear-missile attack cannot be met by a 
similar strategy. Indeed, for the first time such an attack threatens 
Soviet political centers without a need for a foreign foe to invade 
Soviet territory. The impact of such a possibility must be viewed 
against the background of the 1941 Nazi attack. Even without the 
capture of such key centers as Moscow and Leningrad, the German 
invasion almost led to U.S.S.R.’s collapse. 
THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
In addition to the two-front and U.S. threats, the Soviets face a 
problem with regard to the developing areas. Like the Soviet-postu- 
lated threat from the United States, this is also a new postwar chal- 
lenge: how to effectively project U.S.S.R.’s military power and in- 
fluence beyond its periphery, regardless of whether the need arises 
from great power imperatives or ideological requirements for the sup- 
port of ‘“‘national liberation struggles.” In Stalin’s days, this problem 
did not confront Soviet strategists since he neither asserted overseas 
objectives nor did the Soviets have the capabilities for attaining them. 
Indeed, he viewed the Third World as a strategic reserve of “Western 
imperialism’’; given the latter’s control over the reserve areas, they 
could only be undermined through an attack on the “homeland” 
capitalist bastions. 
In this context, Stalin viewed the few ex-colonial areas at the time 
which had gained their independence from the mother-countries, e.g., 
India, as “‘lackeys of imperialism” since these new nations would 
not blindly follow his lead. The Soviet view then was relatively simple: 
those who were not with them were against them. 
On Stalin’s death, Khrushchev drastically reversed Soviet policy: 
even if the Third World countries chose not to be totally subservient 
to the Soviet cause, they could serve Soviet interests as long as they 
were anti-Western. The new policy opened up a vast arena for Soviet 
political action; but it also confronted the Soviet strategists with the 
concrete problem of how to exert Soviet influence in areas beyond 
the Soviet periphery. This was a particularly challenging problem at 
that time because the Soviets lacked both naval and air capabilities 
for delivering Soviet material support over long distances or for show- 
