29 
ing the flag. Indeed, when World War II ended, the U.S.S.R. had 
only a coastal, defensive navy and no strategic air force or air trans- 
port capabilities. 
In sum, the Soviets, as a result of post-Stalin aspirations, have 
been confronted by the gigantic problem of developing separate and 
non-interchangeable capabilities to counter a nuclear-missile attack 
from the United States, to defeat a ground attack on the Eurasian 
continent from either or both the East and the West, and to support 
non-peripheral national liberation struggles. They have had to address 
this problem in the context of a severely strained economy and rising 
demands from the Soviet people to satisfy their consumer needs at 
home. 
OcEANIC POLICY IMPERATIVES 
STRATEGIC 
The Soviet strategic challenges have required an increase in oceanic 
capabilities either “to solve”’ the problems they created or to capitalize 
on the opportunities they offered. Thus, with regard to the two-front 
threat, the Soviets perceive a need not only for landforces but also 
for naval capabilities in order to outflank from the sea both China 
and NATO, particularly West Germany as the European keystone 
of the alliance.® 
With regard to the challenge posed by the United States, the Soviets 
perceive, in addition to strategic missile forces, a need for appropriate 
naval capabilities both to interdict United States assistance to NATO 
in the event of an armed conflict in Europe and to attack the United 
States directly from the oceanic depths, if necessary.!° Such a naval 
capability is particularly required because the United States, as a 
power outside the Eurasian continent, is beyond the reach of the 
U.S.S.R.’s landforces and hence cannot be dealt with in a “traditional” 
manner of being overrun by those forces. 
In a similar vein of a new challenge not amenable to a traditional 
solution, the Soviets have had to confront an unfamiliar problem 
of projecting Soviet presence and influence in the developing world; 
the latter, like the United States, consists of areas beyond the 
U.S.S.R.’s immediate periphery. As a result, the Soviets perceive a 
need for appropriate naval and maritime capabilities. Since the mid- 
fifties, they have addressed the problem by developing airlift and 
sealift capabilities as well as training amphibious and airborne forces. 
These are intended to meet the great power requirements of being 
able to ‘‘show the flag,’ e.g., Soviet ships now make port calls with 
great regularity. At the same time, the increased capabilities are also 
needed to meet the ideological requirements of being able to support 
“struggles for national liberation” via military advisers and materiel, 
as was the case, for example, in Vietnam and, most recently, in 
Angola. 
“Soviet Navy’s need for a capability to strike objectives deep in the rear of an enemy is detailed in 
“Boyevoi Put’”’, op.cit.” p. 493. In this connection, Admiral Gorshkov indicates the Soviet Navy has 
capabilities to affect the outcome of a conflict on continental as well as ocean war theaters. 
104 discussion of how sealanes of potential oceanic enemy must be disrupted and his home terri- 
tory targets hit is contained in ibid, pp. 491-492. 
