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POLITICAL-ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES 
The development of Soviet oceanic policy and the buildup of 
maritime capabilities have been further fueled by economic and 
agricultural problems in the U.S.S.R. Since World War II, the Soviet 
leadership has been under political pressure to increase the Soviet 
standard of living. This effort has been retarded by continuously poor 
performance of Soviet agriculture. As an alternative, the Soviet leaders 
have been forced to “‘turn to the sea’’; the U.S.S.R. has built floating 
“fishing factories” in order to “‘harvest’’ and process oceanic catches. 
Illustrative of the increasing role of fish in the Soviet diet is the 
plan of U.S.S.R.’s leaders to shift their people from meat to fish 
by increasing internal consumption of the latter. For example, the 
sale of fish in 1976 is to be increased by 25 percent.'’ The disastrous 
impact of the low grain yields in 1975 will add urgency to Soviet 
plans; because meat may be scarcer than ever, the Soviet people 
will have to shift to fish regardless of their preferences. 
Then, too, the Soviet Union has been under pressure to acquire 
its own large merchant fleet; the latter is needed both to carry Soviet 
goods as a way of conserving scarce hard currency, and to carry 
the goods of others as a way of earning such currency needed to 
finance the purchase of Western technology and know-how for use 
by the Soviet economy. The strength of the Soviet imperative to 
expand its merchant fleet is suggested by the fact that the build- 
up took place at some political and economic cost: because of its 
own limited shipbuilding capabilities, the U.S.S.R. has had to place 
orders with others, e.g., with East European shipyards. It would have 
undoubtedly preferred to have had the ships built at home. 
POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS 
While responding to the imperatives noted above, Soviet oceanic 
policy has been, and is, affected by numerous dilemmas and obstacles 
rooted in (a) Russian history and culture, (b) internal Soviet political 
system; and (c) U.S.S.R.’s attempt to be simultaneously a great power 
nation-state, a claimant to ideological leadership of the Communist 
world, and a moving force in the non-Communist developing world. 
HISTORICAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS 
As. a successor to landlocked Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union does 
not have a long maritime tradition and experience to draw on in 
developing its oceanic policy and perfecting its maritime capabilities. 
This has necessitated developing among the Soviet people an awe 
for Russia’s naval glory and a feeling for the seas, supplemented 
by appropriate training for survival in an unfamiliar environment. In 
fact, the Soviet regime feels compelled to thoroughly indoctrinate 
its youth in the traditions of the Russian Navy and the history of 
its exploits, even if the latter by comparison with the Western maritime 
powers are few, and then to cap the indoctrination by expositions 
on the growth of U.S.S.R.’s own oceanic prowess.” And after the 
"This is according to plans announced by N. Baibakov, Head of the Soviet Planning Agency 
(Gosplan), on Dec. 2, 1975. 
2 A description of typical indoctrination and training, focused on the Soviet youth in the Far East- 
ern Province, is contained in V. Goryunov, ‘Put’ y Okean” (The Road to the Ocean), DOSAAF 
Publishing House, Moscow, 1974. 
