32 
(1) The Decembrist uprising in St. Petersburg in 1825 was led 
by Russian officers who during the war against Napoleon marched 
to the West and were exposed to Western political ideas; 
(2) Sailors of the Baltic fleet were the mainstay of the Bolshevik 
Revolution in 1917 (they could be considered lineal descendants of 
the Decembrists in terms of playing a major role in the Pl | 
against the Tsar); and 
(3) It was also these very same sailors who revolted against the 
Soviet regime at Kronstadt in 1921 because they believed Lenin had 
betrayed the revolutionary ideals (the sailors were brutally put down 
by the Bolshevik forces led by Tukhachevsky, who as a future marshal 
was ironically himself purged by Stalin in 1937 after becoming dis- 
enchanted with Soviet rule). 
The foregoing historical background has particular relevance to 
U.S.S.R.’s oceanic policy: the regime has to depend on its personnel 
to implement the policy. But many of its people must of necessity 
operate beyond the Soviet borders and hence beyond the pervasive, 
internal control system. But, in being abroad, this personnel is exposed 
to ‘“‘alien influences” and can, in addition to itself being affected, 
on return home “infect” the Soviet people. The Soviet regime’s sen- 
sitivity on this score is reflected in commentary which warn Soviet 
personnel abroad against being taken in by seductive but false Western 
ideology and appearances.” 
FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS 
The U.S.S.R. also has foreign policy and ideological dilemmas re- 
lated to its oceanic policy. These arise from its need on differing 
occasions to side ‘“‘with” or “against’”’ both the advanced nations of 
the West and the developing countries. In the process of building 
up and using its oceanic capabilities in pursuit of its great power 
aspirations, the U.S.S.R. (in common with the advanced nations) has 
developed a vested interest on oceanic issues such as preserving un- 
restricted passage of straits and limiting the expansion of territorial 
water claims. But this has put the U.S.S.R. in an unwelcome conflict 
with many developing nations, even though it would prefer, on the 
basis of ideological imperatives and competition with the West for 
influence among those nations, to lead them against the “imperialist” 
or “‘neo-colonial”’ West. 
Their ambivalence on many oceanic issues of interest to the 
developing nations has exposed the Soviets to political exploitation 
by China, its archrival in both the Communist and the non-Communist 
developing world. Now that it has acquired a vested interest in com- 
mon with the West, the U.S.S.R. is accused within the Communist 
world of having betrayed the revolutionary cause by siding with the 
West; within the non-Communist developing world, the U.S.S.R. is 
attacked for being unqualified to lead the developing nations because, 
as an advanced state, it cannot possibly understand their needs and 
promote their interests. 
The Soviets have tried to counter the Chinese attack by joining 
the developing world in ‘‘anti-colonialist” votes against the West. But 
~ For example, the main Soviet naval organ has noted that Soviet sailors in foreign ports are sub- 
jected to ‘attacks of bourgeois propaganda”’; it calls for strengthening their vigilance and for preserv- 
ing their “class feeling.”’ (See ‘““Morskoi Sbornik’’, No. 8 1975, pp. 7-10.) 
