33 
in doing so the Soviets are caught in still another dilemma affecting 
their oceanic policy. Even as it expands its oceanic capabilities at 
the expense of the West in response to’ strategic and political impera- 
tives, the U.S.S.R. has been forced to turn to that very same West 
for technology and know-how in order to help the Soviet economy 
improve its poor performance. The latter is due to the central internal 
problem: the Communist Party has maintained its pervasive control 
over the Soviet system even when this has had to be done at the 
expense of economic efficiency, as has been the case to date. 
Of course, the problem can be solved by fundamental economic 
and political reform. But to avoid this and still mitigate the negative 
impact of their pervasive control over the economy, the Soviet Party 
leaders modified their policy toward the West in the early 1970’s; 
among other things, they promoted detente to obtain Western 
technology and industrial management skills. In this situation, any 
large-scale U.S. response to meet their material needs would enable 
the Soviets to continue the current expansion of their oceanic capabili- 
ties by freeing their own resources for such a buildup. However, 
since such an expansion has been taking place at its expense, the 
United States may balk at providing the Soviets with the technological 
help that could be used to undermine its own interests. 
FUTURE SOVIET POLICY 
U.S.S.R.S PERCEPTION OF REACTION TO ITS FOREIGN POLICY 
A negative U.S. reaction at the level of technology might ultimately 
be only a part of a much larger, negative foreign reaction to the 
expansive Soviet policy. The Soviets already exhibit concern over 
such a possible reaction and perceive threats that objectively are 
nonexistent, yet reflect their views of possible developments, most 
particularly in the strategic area involving the question of national 
survival. 
Thus, with regard to the two-front challenge, the Soviets conceive 
of possible collusion against them of China in the East and Germany 
in the West. The first seeds of this potential were sown, in Soviet 
eyes, in the 1960’s when the strongly anti-Soviet Christian Democrats 
were in control of West Germany. In the Soviet view, the possibility 
of such collusion continues even though the Social Democrats may 
be, as they are currently, in power, particularly when the government 
is headed by such a tough-minded leader as Helmut Schmidt, an 
old opponent of the Communists. 
The Soviet views of the German Socialist leaders must be put in 
an historic, but relevant context. The Social Democrats have always 
been the archrival of the Communists because they compete for sup- 
port of the same group, the workers. The Social Democratic (SPD) 
leadership in general has been described as a capitalist tool, serving 
by its reform-like policies to divert the German workers from the 
true revolutionary path. And, SPD leaders such as Schmidt in particu- 
lar have been described as uncompromising enemies of the U.S.S.R. 
The current rapproachment between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, 
represented by Bonn’s “‘Ostpolitik,” has only temporarily muted Soviet 
distrust of SPD’s intentions. Even so, the Soviets have taken due 
note, for example, of Schmidt’s continuing championing of the main- 
