34 
tenance of NATO’s unity and strength and of his efforts to keep 
up Germany’s own defense budget and its major role in NATO.'® 
Moreover, in the Soviet view, Ostpolitik, whether formulated by 
the Christian or Social Democrats, has the following long-term objec- 
tive: by establishing supposedly friendly links in East Europe, Germany 
intends to undermine Soviet influence in the area and ultimately to 
obtain German reunification at the expense of Soviet interests.!” 
It is from the foregoing perspective that the Soviets have drawn 
their own conclusions about possible Sino-German collusion. In this 
connection, Schmidt’s visit to Peking last November and the senti- 
ments of parallel interests expressed by him and the Chinese on that 
occasion did not go unnoticed by the Soviets. And, to complete the 
picture, Soviet concern is further fed by China’s urging NATO to 
retain its unity and strength against Soviet hegemony, thus paralleling 
Schmidt’s views on NATO.?® 
Any full-scale Sino-German collusion could alone drastically step 
up Soviet alarm, given their almost irrational fear of a two-front 
threat. But compounding Soviet concern is the possibility that the 
Sino-German collusion could be widened to include Japan. However 
remote a possibility at this time, the Soviets do not exclude it, again 
in the light of their reading of past history which has seen Japan 
and Russia as bitter enemies. Even now, the Soviets are supersensitive 
to any Japanese contacts with China which the latter is deliberately 
trying to manipulate to its advantage against the U.S.S.R. 
The Chinese at present are pressuring Japan to sign treaties that 
incorporate an expression of joint Sino-Japanese opposition to 
“superpower hegemony.” While nominally intended to include the 
United States, the Chinese effort is directed against the Soviets and 
the latter have interpreted it as such. As a result, the Soviets are 
putting equal pressure on Japan to reject the Chinese overtures. But 
Japan is resisting Soviet pressure while not excluding the Chinese 
bid, and is thereby feeding Soviet concern. Prime Minister Miki 
categorically rejected a heavyhanded attempt by Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko during his visit to Tokyo in January, 1976 to obtain 
a Japanese commitment not to include the “‘superpower hegemony” 
clause in any treaty with China.!® Japan’s action has left it free to 
make whatever alliances it wants in the future. 
Against the background of these and related developments, the 
Soviets view a future German-Chinese-Japanese combination as feasi- 
ble because, among other reasons, all have latent or explicit territorial 
claims against the U.S.S.R. The Chinese, of course, have openly ex- 
pressed their determination to regain ultimately the territories seized 
by the Russians under the unequal treaties of the 17th, 18th, and 
'®For a description of the basic Soviet distrust of the SPD and its leaders, see N. A. Trunin, 
“Militarizatsiya FRG i Politika Sotsial—Demokraticheskoi Partii’”” (The Militarization of the FRG and 
the Policy of the Social-Democratic Party). 
'’For a Soviet examination of the ulterior motives of Bonn’s policy toward the U.S.S.R. and East 
Europe, see M. S. Voslenskii, ‘‘Vostochnaya”’ Politika FRG (the “‘Eastern”’ Policy of the FRG). 
'*The foundations and implications of Sino-German collusion are examined in A. I. Stepanov, 
“FRG i Kitai - listorii Otnoshenii, 1949-74” (FRG and China—On the History of Relations 
1949-74), International Relations Publishing House, Moscow, 1974. 
19See Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1976. In fact, Miki asserted Japan’s intent to sign as soon as possi- 
ble a peace treaty with China that includes such a clause. 
