36 
FUTURE SOVIET BEHAVIOR 
Yet in acting on these claims within the framework of an expansive 
foreign policy, the Soviets could trigger an actual combination which 
is only a figment of their subjective imagination at this time. But 
should the political-military combinations that now concern them ac- 
tually begin to form, the Soviets would undoubtedly react as they 
have in the past: attempt to disrupt such alliances by making expedient 
deals with one or another of the several members. 
Even now, in recognition of a two-front threat and challenge by 
the United States, the U.S.S.R. has attempted to defuse its disputes 
with some adversaries (such as the United States and West Germany) 
in order to concentrate its energies on facing what it considers to 
be the more immediate and direct threats (such as the one posed 
by Communist China) and avoid confronting all rivals simultaneously. 
The practical effect of détente with the United States and Ostpolitik 
with West Germany to date has been to give U.S.S.R. breathing time 
to build up its capabilities in the East against China. 
This general strategy is in line with traditional Soviet behavior. 
Historically, the Soviets have calmed disputes on one front while 
turning to face a challenge on another. This occurred, for example, 
in the late 1930’s when the Soviets signed a nonagression pact with 
Nazi Germany to forestall an attack from the West at a time when 
they were fighting Japan in the East; then, on the eve of the Nazi 
attack in June 1941, they signed a Neutrality Pact with Japan in 
order to forestall the latter from joining Nazi Germany in a simultane- 
ous attack on the U.S.S.R. 
But until a full-blown, ‘“‘worst case’ combination of United States, 
China, Germany, and Japan develops (if it ever does in fact) the 
Soviets are likely to continue their expansive foreign policy.” In turn, 
their activities abroad will undoubtedly include even greater use, and 
the resultant need for continuing the buildup, of their oceanic capabili- 
ties since that policy has in the first instance provided the major 
impetus for the buildup and the employment of such capabilities. 
IMPLICATIONS 
In sum, the current Soviet oceanic policy has been developed in 
response to foreign policy, strategic, and domestic political-economic 
imperatives. This policy has radically transformed the U.S.S.R. from 
a landlocked insular nation to a global competitor of the United 
States, as demonstrated by the appearance of Soviet capabilities on 
all the oceans of the world. Yet this transformation has given rise 
to political dilemmas and strategic dangers which may limit the benefit 
the U.S.S.R. may derive from its new status as an oceanic power. 
It would seem appropriate for the United States to take note of 
22 Indeed, they may do so even when they should prudently desist to prevent the worst from materi- 
alizing; they have miscalculated in the past and this constitutes a danger to all concerned. It should 
be noted, however, that Soviets clearly want to avoid any miscalculations which could be fatal to 
them in the nuclear era. Thus the Soviet military have in recent years been studying how wars broke 
out in the past, particularly those which the weaker parties, in defiance of logic, initiated against the 
stronger. This has current relevance because the Soviets now consider themselves stronger than any- 
one else, possibly not even excluding the United States. (The U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship ts 
noted these days in the following terms: “the correlation of forces” has shifted heavily in favor of the 
“socialist world.””) Given the nuclear dangers, they presumably would be more sensitive in the future 
than they were in the 1930’s to triggering a hostile alliance against themselves. 
