3 
of goods and materials to our allies and Armed. Forces wherever 
they may be. In addition, our dependence on imported oil and critical 
materials requires that supply lines be maintained into the Continental 
United States as well. The Soviet Union has countered the naval 
power of the United States since the late 1950’s and 1960’s by con- 
structing a fleet capable of disrupting supply lines essential to the 
United States. Tactically, it is easier to disrupt communications than 
to protect them and the type of naval fleet necessary to conduct 
these divergent military roles will be different. Thus the U.S. Navy 
has emphasized the role of the aircraft carrier and capital vessels 
to protect them, while the Soviets have structured its strike force 
around submarines and small, maneuverable, tactical vessels. 
When comparing naval power, the comparison of a fleet designed 
to maintain and protect lines of communication and supply with a 
fleet designed for attack and disruption of communications is difficult. 
The current debate on our naval fleet which centers on a comparison 
between the number of ships, tonnage, and armament expenditures 
of the two superpowers will not provide answers to the question 
of how the United States is to respond to the Soviet challenge. It 
does not go to the heart of the problem: Can we control the sea 
lanes in areas of vital importance to the United States, and can we 
project power ashore in Western Europe and the Mediterranean as 
indicated by our foreign policy? What is required is an objective 
appraisal of the need for pursuing our foreign policy in terms of 
kinds of vessels, state of technology and deployment. Whatever the 
outcome of the debate on the future structure of the U.S. Navy 
to meet the Soviet challenge, we must consider the related impact 
of our military posture on other aspects of ocean policy, such as 
maritime transportation and marine science and technology. 
MERCHANT MARINE 
The Soviet merchant marine, which was one-twentieth the size of 
the U.S. merchant navy at the end of World War II, is now approxi- 
mately equal in tonnage capacity to the United States 30 years later. 
At the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union merchant 
fleet consisted largely of war-worn outmoded vessels. About 20 per- 
cent of the Russian fleet was made up of cargo carriers provided 
by the United States under the Lend-Lease Act. In contrast, the 
United States had assembled the largest merchant fleet in the world 
which, during the post-war period, carried more than two-thirds of 
the Nation’s overseas trade. In the past 30 years, the United States 
has dropped from first place in tonnage to ninth place; while the 
Soviet Union has built its merchant marine capacity to the point 
that it approximately equaled ours in 1975. Only 5 percent of the 
U.S. overseas trade is currently carried by American flag vessels while 
the Soviet Union transports 60 percent of its own overseas trade 
in Soviet flag vessels. 
The Soviet Union has managed to compete with the Western 
maritime nations by cutting shipping rates of their Government-owned 
merchant fleet to well below the minimum offered by the Western 
shipping companies. This has enabled the Soviet Union to enhance 
their contacts with the developing countries and reduce the Third 
World countries’ dependence upon the Western shipping industry. 
69-315 O - 76 -- 2 
