ALTERNATIVE U.S. RESPONSES TO SOVIET OCEAN POLICY ! 
(By Seyom Brown* ) 
An effective and prudent response to the ambitious ocean policy 
of the Soviet Union should be based on an assessment of how Soviet 
use of the ocean can affect the broad range of U.S. interests. Since 
U.S. and Soviet ocean policies are involved in a close feedback rela- 
tionship, an accurate assessment of the implications of Soviet maritime 
behavior for U.S. interests must be informed by an appreciation of 
the ways U.S. and Soviet actions in this field affect one another. 
U.S. policy alternatives reflecting this interactive process can be 
described under three headings: (a) arms race vs. arms limitation, 
(b) restrictive vs. overlapping deployments, and (c) unilateralism vs. 
bilateralism vs. multilateralism. 
ARMS RACE vs. ARMS LIMITATION 
It has become evident that the Soviets no longer feel they must 
accept a condition of naval inferiority vis-a-vis the United States.” 
Consequently, a push by the United States to maintain supremacy 
over the expanding Soviet fleet is most likely to accelerate the naval 
arms race, just as a Soviet drive to attain naval superiority must 
engender a crash augmentation of the U.S. Navy.* The only outcome 
that realistically can be expected from such competition is a kind 
of crude superpower parity in naval arms, but with considerably more 
weapons than would be in their inventories had there been an agree- 
ment (even tacit) to accept parity. 
What are the costs of a full-blown U.S.-Soviet naval arms race? 
Surely some billions of dollars annually added to the naval program 
that might have been saved if parity could be stabilized at lower 
levels. Perhaps some multiple of this additional expense—in the form 
of general increases in the defense budget resulting from the revival 
of Cold War attitudes that would be a necessary correlative of the 
full-blown naval arms race. Less tangible, but of greater consequence 
than the defense budget increases, would be the greater risks of super- 
power confrontations associated with the revival of the Cold War. 
* The author is director of the U.S.-Soviet relations program at the Carnegie Endowment for In- 
ternational Peace. This essay was written while he was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 
‘The author is indebted to Barry M. Blechman, Robert Weinland, Larry Seaguist, and Ann Good- 
man of the Brookings Institute for comments on earlier dafts. However, the views expressed here are 
solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the Brookings Institution or other in- 
dividuals associated with it. 
“Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, “Soviet Ocean Activities: A Preliminary 
Survey” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975). 
*The position that the United States should attempt to maintain naval supremacy was well articu- 
lated by Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II in a speech before the American Legion on 
Aug. 15, 1975. For the text see ““Vital Speeches of the Day” Vol. XXXXI, No. 23 (Sept. 15, 1975), 
pp. 706-708. 
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