40 
Some may argue that support for detente is on the wane anyway 
in both countries, and the growing Soviet-American competition in 
naval arms is merely the symptom of their underlying protracted power 
rivalry. Acceptance of this argument, however, should not dispose 
of the need to conduct the power rivalry at least cost and danger 
to the United States. 
Are there any benefits from a full-blown U.S.-Soviet naval arms 
race? The two superpowers might each hope for international gains 
from their bilateral naval competition, because even though neither 
can dominate the other, their need to keep up with each other will 
continue to stimulate fleet modernization programs on both sides. 
In a world characterized by heightened competition among many 
countries for ocean resources, a first-class global naval capability 
against third parties may come to be regarded by each superpower 
as not just a bonus from their bilateral rivalry, but one of the animat- 
ing premises of the naval program in both countries. 
Nor can we ignore the uncomfortable truth that a dramatic U.S.- 
Soviet naval arms race probably would have more of a stimulating 
effect on U.S. arms programs than on Soviet programs because of 
the greater extent to which the resource allocation process in our 
representative political system is affected by popular sentiment. This 
being the case, it would seem that the Soviets would want to avoid 
a visible naval competition. But Admiral Gorshkov also needs to battle 
for his bite of the defense ruble, and it would be surprising if he 
did not look with some pleasure at the growing agitation here to 
beef up the U.S. Navy to meet the growing Soviet naval threat.* 
Despite the tacit interaction between navy champions on both sides, 
there are obvious asymmetries in the domestic political requirements 
for maintaining a strong military posture. This is not the most readily 
admitted reason in the United States for opposing arms limitation 
agreements and/or an atmosphere of detente that reduces anxiety 
about the Soviet threat. But there may well be a significant tradeoff, 
albeit intangible and difficult to calculate, between (a) the budgetary 
savings and reductions in U.S.-Soviet hostility that would be associated 
with an effort to stabilize the superpower naval arms competition, 
and (b) the stimulus that an open and tough naval arms race would 
give to the popular support needed to sustain the long-term power 
rivalry with the Soviet Union. 
If it is decided that the prospective benefits of mutual naval arms 
limitations outweigh the hypothetical negative effects of the presumed 
loss of American “will,” U.S. policy will still need to hedge against 
the Soviets deploying naval capabilities that suddenly appear substan- 
tially better than ours. As in the strategic arms field, the hedges 
probably should be in the form of impressive research and develop- 
ment programs, and the American public will have to be educated 
to accept at least this much as a necessary condition of naval arms 
control. 
Some may doubt the desirability and feasibility of negotiating a 
naval parity agreement with the Soviet Union, given the different 
~ 4For insight into the ways in which the Soviet Admiral of the Fleet uses arguments about U.S. 
strategies and capabilities to buttress his pleas for an expanded Soviet navy, see Robert G. Weinland, 
Robert W. Herrick, Michael McGwire and James McConnell, ‘Admiral Gorshkov’s ‘Navies in War 
and Peace’,” Survival, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (March/April 1975), pp. 54-63. 
