4] 
geopolitical circumstances and naval strategies of the two superpowers: 
The United States, almost an island in the great world ocean, its 
major allies overseas, its foreign commerce mainly via maritime trans- 
port; the Soviet Union, virtually landlocked and icelocked, its major 
allies on its Western land frontiers, its main passages to the sea 
through narrow waterways bounded by other countries, and most of 
its foreign commerce traditionally over land. The established naval 
strategy of the United States being to control the seas; the apparent 
Soviet objective in recent years being to deny us this control. 
In light of these strategic asymmetries, what could possibly be the 
operational meaning of “‘parity’’? 
What may be needed is a reconceptualization of the basic naval 
objectives of both the Soviet Union and the United States, which 
in turn could provide the basis for a workable concept of naval 
parity. For either power to strive for control of the seas and the 
other to attempt to deny such control is to stage a zero-sum game 
(one’s gain is the other’s loss and vice versa) incompatible with stabil- 
ized arms limitation. But if access to and use of the ocean, rather 
than control, were the objectives on both sides, the U.S.-Soviet 
maritime relationship could be conceived of largely in non-zero-sum 
terms which would be compatible with naval limitations under a con- 
cept of gross parity. 
In the strategic weapons field, the recognition that both sides 
without agreement already had achieved a condition of gross parity 
provided a context for the SALT agreements on numerical limits 
in certain categories of weapons. But this codification of gross parity 
would not have been possible without the willingness on each side 
to accord legitimacy to the other side retaining an awesome second- 
strike capability. Similarly, in the naval field (beyond strategic sub- 
marines for which parity already has been legitimized in SALT), a 
recognition that both sides will be achieving, outside of any formal 
agreement, a condition of gross parity in their capabilities for access 
to and use of the great world ocean could form the basis for a 
mutual legitimization of such capabilities. Translating such a basic 
accord into precise agreements on inventory limitations in various 
naval categories will not be easy, but it should be no more difficult 
than the attempt to agree on arms limits on the European continent.° 
RESTRICTED VS. OVERLAPPING DEPLOYMENTS 
Intersecting the arms race/arms limitation issue is the question of 
what should be the U.S. policy toward the drive of the Soviets to 
establish a global maritime presence. Clearly, the only way to contain 
the Soviet maritime presence to less than global perimeters, given 
the rapidly developing Soviet capabilities for global access, would 
be for the United States to maintain overwhelming naval superiority 
and a credible strategy of confronting the Soviets should they venture 
beyond the perimeters we had unilaterally proclaimed. But if the 
naval supremacy policy is no longer feasible for the reasons indicated 
above, then such a maritime containment policy also has become 
anachronistic. This leaves two major U.S. policy alternatives for 
>For some suggestive approaches to such limitations on naval inventories see Barry M. Blechman, 
“The Control of Naval Armaments” (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1975), pp. 11-30. 
