42 
responding to the new maritime reach of the U.S.S.R.: (1) efforts 
to achieve agreement on areas where maritime deployments would 
be restricted in certain categories to one or both superpowers; or 
(2) acceptance of each other’s deployments in most areas of the 
ocean. 
AGREED RESTRICTIONS ON DEPLOYMENTS 
The designation of regions of the ocean where particular superpower 
maritime deployments would be restricted could take either or both 
of two forms: (a) tacit or explicit agreement between the superpowers 
on areas in which one would concede a dominant (in some cases 
exclusive) presence to the ships of the other; or (b) agreement, 
probably explicit, between the superpowers and other states to keep 
certain categories of ships and/or activities out of particular areas. 
The first form of restrictive deployment is analogous to the spheres 
of superpower dominance in Western and Eastern Europe that charac- 
terized the height of the Cold War. Such unchallenged spheres of 
naval dominance have in fact prevailed in the Baltic, Barents, and 
Black seas for the Russians; and the Mediterranean (before 1967), 
most of the Pacific, most of the Atlantic and the Caribbean for the 
Americans. They also have generally prevailed in the territorial waters 
and ports of military allies and client states of either superpower. 
Recently, however, with the disintegration of the extended Cold War 
coalitions, the rise of neutralism, and the accompanying efforts of 
smaller states to maintain commercial and political relations with b8th 
superpowers, an agreement on spheres of naval dominance does not 
appear to be a viable basis for global maritime coexistence between 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
The second form of restriction on deployments is contemplated 
in proposals to limit the numbers and types of Soviet and U.S. war- 
ships in zones of confrontation such as the eastern Mediterranean 
or to keep Soviet and U.S. naval vessels and military facilities out 
of the Inidan Ocean and its littoral areas.6 A variant of this form 
of restriction would feature specially designated lanes for warships 
and commercial vessels navigating the coastal waters or straits of 
other states; such restrictions are likely to emerge out of the Law 
of the Sea negotiations, as are coastal-state restrictions on oceano- 
graphic vessels and installations. 
Two considerations need to be distinguished: One is how the U.S.- 
Soviet competition may be affected by such deployment limitations. 
The other is the significance of such limitations for relations between 
each of the superpowers and third parties. 
One objective of superpower maritime limitations in specific areas 
of the ocean is to reduce the risks of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in 
zones of tension. Another objective may be simply to prevent a super- 
power naval race in a particular area, say, the Indian Ocean, even 
though the area itself may not be the locale of any important conflict 
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
It is questionable, however, whether the best means of avoiding 
dangerous confrontations in zones of high tension, for example, the 
Middle East, is a mutual limitation on naval deployments. If one 
®See Blechman, “‘The Control of Naval Armaments”, pp. 31-71, 99-100. 
