45 
the extent of U.S. and Soviet naval deployments are determined in 
part by considerations beyond their bilateral rivalry, such as in the 
Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, or the northwest Pacific, the two 
superpowers will continue to size their respective forces primarily 
with reference to each other’s strength. Negotiations to limit naval 
deployments in particular regions should include at least the local 
littoral states as well as the superpowers, but as in other multilateral 
arms control negotiations (such as the nonproliferation treaty, or the 
seabed arms limitation agreement), a superpower consensus usually 
will be the necessary precondition for the multilateral agreement.’ 
When it comes to general ocean regime issues, however, neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union separately or together, or 
for that matter in concert with the other major maritime powers 
(the United Kingdom, France, and Japan), swing a determining weight. 
As has become evident in the Law of the Sea negotiations, the 
acquiescence of the majority of some 130 coastal countries has 
become crucial to the exercise of U.S. ocean mobility. The real and 
immediate threats to our basic geopolitical interests in access to 
foreign sources of energy and other raw materials, to commercial 
partners, and to military staging areas come from this quarter rather 
than from the Soviet Union. Indeed, on many of the general ocean 
regime issues, the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves 
partners in a minority coalition against the coalition Third World 
of coastal states. But paradoxically, while a split between the United 
States and the Soviet Union on issues affecting general maritime mo- 
bility could play into the hands of the coalition of coastal states, 
evidence of close concerting by the superpowers on Law of the Sea 
issues tends to strengthen the influence of militant coastal-state na- 
tionalists. China, as might be expected, loses no opportunity to con- 
demn any common front by the Soviet Union and the United States, 
and tries to find examples of “superpowerism” in most of the positions 
taken by the maritime-state minority. 
Considering the broadening array of countries with capabilities to 
severely impede U.S. access to and use of the ocean, and given 
the coalition politics of the Law of the Sea conference, a multilateral 
orientation to most aspects of general U.S. ocean policy has become 
essential. Yet the omnipresence of U.S.-Soviet ocean relationships can- 
not be avoided. This tension between the multilateral and bilateral 
dimensions of U.S. ocean policy is likely to complicate U.S. ocean 
diplomacy and policymaking in the years ahead. In some respects 
the problem is analogous to the tensions between bilateralism and 
multilateralism in efforts to negotiate strategic arms limitation agree- 
ments with the U.S.S.R., where the United States pays a price in 
relations with its NATO allies for pursuing agreement with the Soviets 
in direct negotiations. 
These observations on policy alternatives generated by the coming 
of age of the Soviet Union as a maritime power are meant to pose 
questions rather than to prescribe. But they do point to at least 
one policymaking imperative: namely, the need for a continuing in- 
7 Restrictions on U.S. and Soviet naval deployments may not always reflect the preferences of the 
superpower nor should the superpowers expect always to be included as negotiating parties to re- 
gional naval arms limitation agreements. The Shah of Iran, for example, has proposed a Persian Gulf 
security pact among the gulf states that would compel the removal of the naval and military presence 
of all outside powers. 
