HISTORICAL CONTINUITY IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET 
OCEANS POLICY* 
(By Nicholas G. Shadrin with assistance from Pamela Houghtaling** ) 
OVERVIEW 
The Oceans Policy of Soviet Russia effectively became worldwide 
under the aegis of Nikita Khrushchev in the late 1950’s. The earlier 
Soviet and Tsarist policy had largely been confined to the Eurasian 
land mass. The change in policy may have been more related to 
an increase in Moscow’s capacity to extend its reach than its desire 
to do so. There are a number of elements of historical continuity 
of Tsarist and Soviet ocean policy, especially as relates to naval power, 
the desire to extend power beyond the borders as far as possible 
may be one such continuous policy. 
At the same time when faced by choices between security of the 
motherland and foreign extensions of power, the choice has continu- 
ously been to favor domestic interests. Thus, the defensive capability 
of naval power has always occupied, and continues to occupy, a 
leavening force on the offensive naval outreach. 
Merchant marine, fishing, oceanographic and other oceans interests 
likewise have their historical continuity. With sharply rising economic 
needs and capability, the elements of continuity in the civilian arena 
is less pronounced than in the naval realm. 
This section surveys the historical development of the key aspects 
of Russian and Soviet maritime power: navy, merchant marine, ship- 
building, fishing industry, river transport, oceanography, and mastering 
of the world’s unique Northern Sea Route. Naval growth and develop- 
ment have been dominant throughout Russian and Soviet maritime 
history. For this reason, particular emphasis is given to the historic 
role of the navy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Prerevolutionary Russia had a relatively well developed shipbuilding 
industry characterized by three distinct features: specialization in naval 
construction, extensive control by foreign capital, and dependence 
(and often far beyond necessity) upon foreign technology. Often more 
profitable, naval construction programs monopolized Russia’s ship- 
building capacity, resulting in the production of very few merchant 
marine vessels. Aware of the need for commercial ships for trading 
purposes, the Soviet Government subsequently attempted to increase 
*[Editor’s Note: Nicholas Shadrin’s paper is based on his doctoral dissertation on “Soviet Maritime 
Power”, submitted to George Washington University in June 1972, which draws some of his observa- 
tions from his experience as a Soviet naval officer and a student of maritime developments within the 
Soviet Union. ] 
**Ms. Houghtaling was, at the time of drafting the paper from Dr. Shadrin’s dissertation, a 
researcher with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
(47) 
