51 
Most of the ships were badly in need of repair, but the navy’s 
supply of spare parts was exhausted. There was no fuel and the 
greater portion of ship repair facilities were damaged, destroyed, or 
deteriorated. Added to the navy’s desperate material condition was 
the problem of ideological reliability and the regime’s trust in the 
navy. 
The Tenth Party Congress resolved “to undertake measures for 
the restoration and strengthening of the Red Navy” subject to the 
‘“‘seneral conditions and material resources of the country.’’ The con- 
gress also decided ‘“‘to strengthen the navy with political workers, 
and to return to the navy all Communist seamen working in other 
fields.” The decree signed by Lenin ordered the salvage of repairable 
ships sunk during the civil war and the repair of available ships.’ 
The intensity of the 1922 ship repair program, according to Lenin, 
had to be defined by “the size of the navy which was necessary 
to keep for political and economic reasons.’’* During the 1921-24 
period, two battleships, two cruisers, and a number of destroyers 
and submarines underwent major repair and entered the service.° 
The first All-Union meeting of Communist seamen to discuss the 
problem of restoring the navy was called in Moscow in April 1922. 
While they discussed the nature of the future navy, participants re- 
jected proposals of two opposing groups: one headed by a former 
Tsarist Navy specialist demanding construction of “‘an open sea fleet,” 
e.g. in general a balanced navy built around super dreadnoughts, 
for “lack of money, production capacity, and human resources,” and 
the so-called young school, demanding construction of a light navy, 
a “mosquito fleet,’ submarines, and aviation for its one-sided empha- 
sis. It was stressed that a navy incorporating all classes of surface 
ships, submarines, and aviation and “acting aggressively in cooperation 
with the Red Army” was needed for the country’s defense. A resolu- 
tion also recommended the sale of old ships and the use of the 
money thus obtained for the speedy restoration of usable ships.’ 
The second state of the Red Navy development and the final stage 
of its restoration started in 1924. The years 1924 and 1925 are known 
as a period of “military reform” worked out by Frunze, who replaced 
Trotsky as chairman of Revvoensovet and the People’s Commissar 
of Military and Naval Affairs. Approved by the April 1924 Plenum 
of the Party Central Committee, the military reform influenced the 
organization, personnel policy, training and hardware development of 
the Red Navy and Red Army.?? 
Fleets, shore defense systems and naval aviation were united into 
the naval forces under a single chief. The military law approved Sep- 
tember 18, 1925, established compulsory military service, and the 
duration of conscript service in the navy was set at 4 years. Starting 
in 1925 the gradual transformation to the one-man command system 
to replace the dual commander-commissar system was initiated in 
the Soviet Armed Forces. In the navy the process was particularly 
slow and exercised with great care, continuing until 1933.” 
7“History of Naval Art”, pp. 163-169. 
*““The Combat Path”, p. 148. 
*“History of Naval Art”, p. 169. 
10“The Combat Path’, pp. 149-150. 
"'““Sudostroyeniye” No. 2, 1970, pp. 52-55. 
‘The number of so-called old specialists, former Tsarist naval officers, in the Navy was considera- 
ble and proportionally higher than in any other services. On the other hand, Party members 
represented only 27 percent of the naval officers. The special nature of the service was also taken 
into consideration. ““Combat Path of the Soviet Navy”, p. 196. 
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